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Our purpose is to provide a reliable source of information about what is happening
in Moslem states and thus to show Western policy-makers and public opinion
the danger Islam presents to Western civilization by citing the Moslems themselves.
Volume 15, Digest 4, April 2003
PITFALLS OF POST-IRAQ POLICIES
After the defeat of Saddam Hussein, the United States and Britain will face problems posed by their wishful thinking - both in Iraq and in the Arab world. There are no prospects of democracy. Lebanon held free elections when governed by its Christians. Ever since 1984, Syria has been effectively ruling it and elections became irrelevant. No democratic Moslem Arab state has ever existed. Only Algeria held a reasonably free election. A fundamentalist Islamic party won it, but the Army promptly took over the Government. The resulting bloody civil war still continues. A genuinely democratic Government in Iraq - or anywhere else in the Arab world - would run counter to Moslem tradition and Islamic precepts. It could survive only if imposed and maintained by foreign armies of occupation.
The Algerian example also highlights another Western delusion - that the people in Arab states are less anti-Western than their rulers. The opposite is true. The frenetic enthusiasm in the Arab "street" for successful acts of terrorism against unbelievers has been seen again and again on the world's television screens. Yet the opaque minds of Western statesmen still do not understand that financial or political concessions cannot end this kind of hatred. Rulers like Mubarak of Egypt and King Abdullah II of Jordan need Western aid to prop up their insolvent economies. The Hashemite regime in Jordan has always relied on Western arms and (sometimes unwritten) guarantees to protect itself from its "brothers" in Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Yet both Mubarak and Abdullah prefer the culture and values of Islam to Western values and cannot risk identification with a non-Moslem state fighting an Arab state, no matter how good its reasons. In 1983, the murder of 241 US marines in Lebanon by Syrian-sponsored terrorists proved a catalyst for the spread of Moslem terrorism. The American reaction - withdrawal from the country without punishing the perpetrators or their sponsors - made things worse. In 1991, the Arab states that participated in a coalition against Iraq did so only because it invaded and conquered a fellow Arab state. Even so, this coalition might not have survived had Bush Senior proceeded to occupy Baghdad. As it was, he left Saddam's terrorist regime intact and Clinton compounded the error by his pro-Moslem policies in the Balkans and the Middle East. All this was regarded in the Arab world as a sign of American weakness. So in 2003 there was never any hope of Arab help against Saddam and there should be no delusions anywhere that the war, whatever its outcome, will defuse anti-American feeling among Arabs, no matter how generously they are treated or how many concessions they are offered. This is largely a matter of Arab national pride, a factor the West has tended to ignore or underestimate. Moreover, the concessions of unbelievers are usually regarded as a sign of Allah's favor and the donors' stupidity. Far from gaining sympathy, they usually encourage resistance and terrorism, in the belief, often justified in the past, that more terrorism will bring more concessions. Unfortunately, there are indications that the United States still considers concessions a key to Moslem goodwill. Some American circles, perhaps even in the State Department, may desire to end the war against terrorism as soon as Iraq is defeated. Changing a mindset that permitted Saudi Arabia to guide US policy in the Middle East until September 11th 2001 is no simple matter. Yet this must be done. Saudi Arabia has been financing not only the spread of Islam but also many Islamic terrorist movements for decades. American credibility and continued superpower status thus depend not only on winning the war in Iraq and deposing Saddam Hussein, but also on continuing the war on terrorism and the regimes that sponsor it until these are eradicated too. Iran should be first on the list. The ousting of Ali Khameney and his clique from power is essential, though it may not be simple as he controls the armed forces and the law courts. He is now preparing trouble for the US in Shiite southern Iraq. But when this clique is eliminated, Khatami and the majority of the Majlis might be ready for a positive attitude to a victorious United States. And this would pave the way to the most desirable solution for post-war Iraq: a loose federation, with a high degree of autonomy for both the Kurdish North and the Shiite South. Keeping the Kurds and Shiites of Iraq under Sunni domination would make a mockery of their "liberation."
MARCH BULLETIN Anti-Semitism - The Deadly Cycle of the Last 100 Years Israel's Political Earthquake
AN INTERVIEW WITH YOHANAN RAMATIWhat threat does Islam pose on an international level? How should the West respond to the Islamic threat? Is a 'Palestinian' state within the borders of Israel inevitable? These and other questions were recently posed to Yohanan Ramati, Director of the Jerusalem Institute for Western Defense
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