The problems of the United States in Iraq are due to wrong priorities. And the wrong priorities are due to wishing to have the best of both worlds by refusing to admit facts. The campaign in Iraq began as part of the war against Moslem terrorism. Its first aim - to displace the oppressive regime of Saddam Hussein - was quickly accomplished. Saddam Hussein did indeed help terrorist organizations, but in this sphere he could not compete with Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia. So the correct priorities after the initial success should have been to exploit it by attacking Syria, removing its regime, ending the Syrian occupation of Lebanon, destroying the Hezbollah infrastructure with as much of its leadership as possible, and following this up by air attacks on a by then demoralized fundamentalist Iran, where a growing reformist movement might well have been able to displace the mullahs without the intervention of US ground troops. This course would have increased US prestige and credibility all over the world, while simultaneously destroying much of the popularity of terrorist organizations in the Moslem world and thus creating a sound basis for further successes in the war against them.

Instead of this, Washington postponed the war on terrorism and decided to concentrate on keeping Iraq united and turning it into a democracy. The first was the worst possible choice and the second is impossible. Iraq can be divided into three geographical areas: the North, where the majority of the population are Kurds; the Center, where they are Arab Sunnis (though many Shiites also live there); and the South, where Arab Shiites dominate. Ethno-religious statistics are unreliable, but can be roughly estimated as follows: Shiites 60%, Kurds 20%, Arab Sunnis 17%, Christians and others 3%.

Arab Sunni rulers have ruled the country since it achieved independence. Though the Kurds are also Sunnis, they are unlikely to accept willingly the renewal of Sunni Arab rule as they were persecuted for much of this period, Saddam Hussein killing thousands with poison gas. The Shiite majority has also grievances against Arab Sunnis. If the unity of Iraq is maintained and the United States is serious about democracy in Iraq, the Shiites will have to be allowed to rule the whole country. Washington realizes this and has already given them a majority of the ministerial posts in the government it intends to take over Iraq. However, the overwhelmingly Sunni Arab Iraqi civil service, whose cooperation with a Shiite government is unlikely, (especially once the US is out of the picture) complicates the situation and it is difficult to imagine such a government ruling Baghdad and the area to its North equitably.

So unless the internal differences prove a catalyst for the emergence of yet another Sunni Arab despot, who will rule ruthlessly against the wishes of 80% of the population, the unity of Iraq will become a prescription for instability and chaos once US and UN forces have left. All the other Arab states are Sunni and are likely to press for the Sunni Arab despot solution, but Washington would be ill advised to support it.

There is no real democracy in any Moslem state, the nearest to it being Indonesia, which is also the least devout. All Arab states have always been dictatorships. Anyone who has read the Koran should understand why. So trying to turn Iraq into a democracy is a waste of time, effort and American lives better expended to fight Moslem terrorism.

The Kurds should be granted independence or at least extensive autonomy and Turkey should be warned not to intervene. Turkey is now likely to have trouble with its own Kurds and would do well to grant autonomy to their moderate majority before the PKK terrorists extend their influence on it. Moreover, a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq is exactly the kind of medicine Arab radicals and fundamentalists need to understand that the US means business. It should be well armed; its forces should receive training from the US and it should be asked to deal with terrorists on its territory, receiving American assistance when required. It should also take over the Iraqi share in the ownership of the oil resources there, providing it with an economic basis for as long as oil remains the main source of energy. Such a Kurdish state would probably be a reliable ally of the US in the Middle East. If Turkey joins the European Union, it will be little more reliable than the EU.

Given the present US policy and aims in Iraq, an increase in terrorism aimed at US forces was only to be expected and duly materialized. As usual, the inherent hostility of Arab Moslems to the West was ignored or underrated. The fear generated by initial American military successes and the destruction of the Saddam Hussein regime gradually dissipated. Since administrative forces and long lines of communication and supply are excellent targets for terrorists and very few liked the democratic values the US was trying to propagate, the temptation to attack the US and British forces was difficult to resist. Successful attacks encouraged more attacks.

Trying to fight such a war “humanely,” instead of eradicating the terrorist infrastructure regardless of collateral damage, was a mistake. Moreover, only an inadequate effort was made to obtain intelligence information about the areas where terrorists are based and who is supporting them. One can safely assume that such an infrastructure exists and supports not only Saddam loyalists and other anti-American groups but also terrorists sent by Syria or entering – with or without official encouragement – from Saudi Arabia. It increased the number of American and British casualties to no good purpose. Nobody was grateful for the occupying armies’ restraint. The result is declining US prestige, more internal opposition to the Iraq war in America and a dangerous feeling of inability to cope.

Thus Washington has a dilemma. An editorial in the Saudi newspaper Arab News this month was able to argue, tongue in cheek, for UN control of Iraq citing US sources and estimates. It begins by stating: “What is important is not America’s dignity but Iraq’s future — its peace, its prosperity, its stability, an end to terrorism there. If the US wanted to hand the baton to the UN then that would be reason to congratulate it. But is this really a climb down?”

The editorial points out that the security situation in Iraq is deteriorating, that the terrorists will not end “their murderous campaign of destabilization” and that there will be more bombs, so more troops are needed to achieve a satisfactory security level. But meanwhile there are plans to limit military service outside the US to one year and if the bill becomes law the 140,000 US troops now in Iraq will have to be reduced to about 100,000. The paper claims that Congress budget office estimates indicate that even 70,000 US troops in Iraq are too many if threats elsewhere in the world are to be met, so at least 70,000 troops from other countries are needed to maintain the present inadequate security level.

However, Saudi Arabia has no interest in the US ability to meet threats. Its aim is to prevent the continuation of the US war against terrorism, though it has tried to confuse Washington by occasionally staging operations against al-Qaeda on its own territory. Riadh has good reason to expect the UN to discourage the war against terrorism. Saudi Arabia’s financing of Hamas is widely known, but very few are aware that it probably also financed al-Qaeda – and even at least one of the attacks on the United States on 11th September 2001.

Twenty-seven pages of a Congressional Report probably dealing with this are being kept secret to avoid embarrassment for the Saudis. It seems that two checks for big amounts signed by the wife of the Saudi Ambassador to Washington, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, were delivered in San Diego to Nawaf Al-Mazi and Khaled Al-Midar by another Saudi, Omar Al Biyumi. Al-Mazi and Al-Midar were two of the hijackers of the civilian aircraft that crashed into the Pentagon on 11th September 2001, killing 180 people. Al-Biyumi not only arranged them accommodation for two months, paying the rental in advance, but also contacted the flying school in Florida where they received flying instruction. The US did not bother the Princess, but demanded the extradition of Al-Biyumi, who left quietly after the bombing and is now in Saudi Arabia. He was not extradited. Prince Bandar is handing out largesse in Washington as usual.

All this is relevant, as Saudis have also been reported attacking US troops in Iraq.

Washington wants to spread the financial and military burden of occupying Iraq, including the cost of reconstruction there, by bringing in the UN, but without offering it political control. Even if feasible, this “solution” is unlikely to promote American interests or to reduce terrorism. The UN headquarters in Baghdad have already been bombed with considerable loss of life including the ranking UN diplomat there, demonstrating the “respect” Arab terrorists have for the United Nations. There is every likelihood that they will react to a UN occupation just as they reacted to a US-British one.

However, it is an excellent bet that France, Germany and the Arab states will not start supporting American policy in the Middle East as a result. So a United Nations administration in Iraq would be body divided against itself and floundering in a morass of conflicting interests. If Washington expects the UN or any of its members who disapprove of US policies to send 70,000 or more troops to Iraq to support them and have no say in the political decisions, it is being both naïve and reckless. The strategic cost of any such troops sent will be a weakening of American influence. As far as troops are concerned, it is far better to approach nations on an individual basis. This has already produced a useful Polish contingent without damaging political consequences and signals strength – not weakness.

As regards the problem of covering the costs of reconstruction in Iraq, this again should not be a subject for the United Nations, but should be strictly separated from the issue of military reinforcements. There is an obvious tradeoff here: The greater the participation in the costs of reconstruction, the greater the economic benefits accruing to the donor in trade with Iraq, investments in its economic assets, etc. A formula can be worked out – possibly in consultation with the provisional Iraqi government – but the negotiations with the donor states should be conducted by the Americans.

As soon as blind adherence to the concept of a united Iraq is abandoned, most of the nation-building problems disappear. The Kurds in the North will be anxious to prove their capacity for independence, so there is a reasonable chance that the main Kurdish factions (other than the PKK) will reach agreement on an adequate level of cooperation. The American contribution should be to insist on the creation of a single Kurdish national army from the existing militias (again excluding the PKK) and help to equip it.

In the South, the Shiites will be able to have a large autonomous area with the religious character they probably prefer, which they cannot force on the Sunnis elsewhere. However, these are Arab Shiites, and while they will want to maintain religious ties with Iran, it is most unlikely that they would be inclined to become submerged in a big Persian state. A confederation or federation with Arab Sunnis, whom they outnumber by more than three to one, would suit them better and seems the most desirable course. The details should be carefully hammered out to avoid the tensions that would be inevitable if the South and the Center of Iraq formed a single political unit.

The Sunni Arabs of Iraq may not like this deal, which to all intents and purposes denies them the prospect of dominating the Arab world, but if the hitherto neglected exiled Opposition assumes the leadership of this part of the federation or confederation, it will not only be happy with its lot but probably also prove at least as good at suppressing Saddamism in its bailiwick as the Americans themselves.

To sum up, this is a far better scenario for the US and Britain than any imaginable if the United Nations is permitted to run Iraq and decide its fate.