The area includes the entire Arab world except for the Maghreb (North Africa West of Egypt.) The region is the cradle of three major religions: Christianity, Judaism and Islam. Three of its cities, Bethlehem, Jerusalem and Mecca, are respectively the spiritual centers for each of the three faiths. The northern tier states of the Middle East, Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey, are Moslem but not Arab. Although only a small part of the billion or so Moslems live in the Middle East, Mecca is the focus of their intense beliefs.
Geography and the presently essential natural resource, petroleum, constitute the strategic importance of the Middle East. The struggle for key geostrategic elements of the Middle East is recorded in the history of the region from the time of the Trojan War for control of the Dardanelles down to the present-day conflict between nations within the region and those outside. This was also the situation during the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Under the parched, arid lands of the Middle East are located the largest single known oil reserves in the world. The focus of US strategic interests in this area stems from these basic factors, oil and the critically important waterways of the region. Petroleum is today the most valuable commodity in world commerce; an indispensable item in time of peace and of critical strategic importance in time of war.
Energy: A Vital Commodity
The universal demand for energy is expected to double each decade to satisfy economic expansion and burgeoning populations. The largest single source of energy is derived from petroleum. The principal consumers for the foreseeable future will be the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. The United States with 6% of the world's population consumes approximately 30% of the annual output of the world's natural resources. Its domestic production of petroleum continues to decline, while its demand for crude oil continues to rise. The US still supplies almost half of its petroleum requirements of 19.6 million barrels per day (mb/d) from domestic production, although this proportion is constantly decreasing. Western Europe and especially Japan are almost totally dependent upon imported oil, principally from the Middle East. The politically strong environmental movement in the US is preventing the exploitation of other large potential domestic oil resources on the California Coast and the northern slope of Alaska. Simultaneously, it has prevented the shift towards more extensive utilization of nuclear power for the generation of electricity now occurring in some other advanced industrial states. For example, France produces close to 90% of its electrical energy from nuclear reactors, as compared with less than 10% in the United States, which was the pioneer in nuclear technology.
The emergence of the Middle East as the world's leading oil producing region occurred only during the last half century. The first significant discovery of petroleum took place in Iran in 1908. Of the proven crude oil reserves in the world today about two-thirds are in the Middle East. Despite the daily production of about 23 million barrels a day, the quantity of known reserves in the Middle East continues to rise because of active exploration. It is estimated that one-third of the known natural gas reserves are also located in the Persian Gulf States.
The present and future dependence of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan upon imports is a matter of paramount significance. Oil from the Middle East also supplies United States military forces throughout the Eastern Hemisphere. The disruption of petroleum supplies from the Middle East in 1973, as a result of the Yom Kippur War, when Israel was attacked by Syria and Egypt, caused serious economic problems for the industrial nations of the world.
Aside from strategic considerations, the United States has a huge economic investment in the Middle East petroleum industry. In 1960 the major oil producing countries, led by the Middle East producers, formed the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) which wields tremendous economic and political power. Another Middle East factor that must be considered is the strident nationalism that pervades the region. This is characterized by extreme hostility to the United States as well as Western culture and presence in general. In the last few decades Islam has become a powerful and very aggressive expansionist force throughout much of the world.
With regards for the rising demands for energy, the low priority currently placed upon developing alternate energy sources is a matter of great concern. Not only is there an element of unreliability with respect to the unrestricted flow of Middle East oil, but it is a non-replenishing commodity. There is only a finite amount available in the world. Each day mankind is burning up this resource, which has taken nature millions of years to produce. Probably no nation has acted with greater irresponsibility in this matter than the United States. Consider the production of electricity. In the United States most of it is produced from fossil fuels such as petroleum. While France and other nations, particularly Japan, are increasingly turning to nuclear energy, the United States has not built a nuclear generating plant in over twenty years and there is none contemplated. This would appear to be a very short-sighted approach to a critical problem. An assured supply of energy is of vital interest to the United States not only in time of war, but also in time of peace.
Petroleum is a fungible commodity. Since the 1991 Gulf War, US imports from the Persian Gulf region have decreased. The reverse is true with respect of Western Europe and the Far East. As the demand for petroleum increases, the two most promising sources for further production are both located in the same region of the world, the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Basin. Of these two, the Persian Gulf is the most important. It is estimated that within ten years the Persian Gulf States will supply one half of the total world oil requirement, exporting about 45 mb/d/ Since most of the increased production must undoubtedly come from the Persian Gulf region, the percentage of United States imports from the Middle East will also rise. In other words there is no visible alternative to greater dependency upon Persian Gulf oil in the foreseeable future. Petroleum and natural gas there are plentiful and easily extracted at relatively low cost. This reality has a powerful impact on political decisions affecting the Middle East by all of the major democracies, including the United States.
It is ironic that the most likely competitor of the Persian Gulf oil exporting nations is the Moslem region right next door, the Caspian Basin. While the latter may possess huge reserves, estimated as high as 200 billion barrels of petroleum and 279 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, the problems attendant to the development of these fields and the distribution of the products are presently still far from solution. The increasing dependence upon petroleum from the Persian Gulf entails serious geopolitical risks. The paramount consideration, however, remains the rising demand for energy. As the sole superpower, the burden of these risks falls upon the United States.
The Middle East and Strategic Waterways
The Mediterranean Sea has for centuries been among the most important waterways in the world, while the entrances and exits of the Eastern Mediterranean have been focal points of conflict. In the 19th century, the European powers fought Turkey for control of three distinct but connected bodies of water - the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara and the Bosphorus. In 1915, Great Britain suffered a crushing defeat in the Gallipoli Campaign for the control of these straits linking the Mediterranean to the Black Sea.
The Suez Canal, financed and built in 1869 by the British and the French, almost immediately became a target of international diplomacy. When Gamal Abdul Nasser, the dictator of Egypt, seized it in 1956, a crisis was precipitated that brought the major powers to the brink of another world war. After the Six Day War between Israel and the Arabs, Egypt closed the Suez Canal for over seven years. Though it was reopened in 1974, it has not regained its former importance due to the development of supertankers for the transport of petroleum. These are too large to transit the Canal and instead are routed round the Cape of Good Hope.
During World War II, the Mediterranean Sea was a fierce battleground greatly influencing the course of the conflict. During the Cold War years that followed, both the United States and the Soviet Union maintained large naval forces there. The powerful US Sixth Fleet is still in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Despite the continuing importance of the Middle East waterways discussed above, the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz are strategically much more critical. The vast petroleum exports of the Middle East pass through these waterways. For this reason, the US has kept a significant naval force on station in the Persian Gulf and will probably maintain its presence there for the foreseeable future. The Gulf has serious potential for conflict that could threaten oil supplies from Saudi Arabia and other states. For more than two decades, Iraq and Iran have posed a major military threat to each other and to the entire Gulf region. Both are very hostile to the United States and Israel.
Armed Conflict in the Middle East
The United States regards the Middle East as a strategic area where war will endanger its interests. The Arab-Israel dispute, which has been festering for over 50 years, provides the most continuous danger of war. Since 1948, Jews and Arabs have fought five major wars, each at a heightened level of sophistication. Yet the Middle East conflict that resulted in the greatest loss of life and destruction was between two Moslem states - Iraq and Iran. Their war lasted from 1980 to 1988.
The disputes and intraregional rivalries in the Middle East pose direct threats to vital US interests. In the 1990-91 Gulf War, the United States mobilized an expeditionary force of half a million troops to protect the uninterrupted supply of the Gulf states' petroleum from Iraqi aggression. Now, the situation is further exacerbated by the imminent acquisition of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons by both Iraq and Iran, which would directly challenge US influence in the region.
Consequently, the Middle East is a crucial factor when the US formulates its military and economic strategy. However, this strategy has been subject to changes. After the Six Day War of 1967, the United States did not act firmly in the Arab interest, preferring not to intervene immediately. Nasser's Egypt and Syria were obviously pro-Soviet at the time, which was a factor in this decision. However, the completeness of the Israeli victory and the reaction of the Arab Summit at Khartoum - no recognition, no negotiation and no peace - to the Eshkol Government's hasty offer to return all the territories occupied in return for peace made any other course impossible. UN Security Council Resolution No.242, sponsored after this war by the US and Britain, does not provide for the return of all the occupied territories.
After the 1967 war, Egypt and Syria naturally turned to the Soviet Union to re-equip their armed forces. Saudi Arabia and the other Arab states of the Gulf remained faithful to their American suppliers, except for Iraq, which had begun to import arms from the USSR already in the late 1950s after the revolution that removed its pro-Western Nuri-es-Said Government and continued to do so. Thus Saudi Arabia's strategic importance to the West on account of its huge oil output and reserves was reinforced by its massive arms purchases at a time when other major Arabs states had turned to the Soviet Union for this purpose. And the Ibn Saud dynasty had always been very hostile to Zionism and Israel.
Since Israel after 1967 could constitute a much more important ally than in the past and was much more reliable politically from the US viewpoint than most Arab states, the hostility of Saudi Arabia to Israel presented Washington with a dilemma. To cope with it, several conflicting alternatives have been considered by American foreign policy makers. These have ranged from maximum support for Israel to counterbalance the combined power of hostile Arab states (and later Iran) to the virtual abandonment of Israel in order to curry favor with the Moslem world and assure lucrative arms and development contracts as well as the vital supply of oil. Over the years, US policy has vacillated between these two extremes.
Abandoning Israel, however, may become the clearly preferred option if Israel allows itself to be further weakened by territorial concessions in the hope of appeasing the Arabs. In this event, only direct US military involvement could save a truncated Israel from destruction. And such a military intervention is uncertain not only because it might ruin US relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt but also because it would be very unpopular with the US public if it involved the loss of American lives. On the other hand, continuous pressure on Israel by successive US administrations to satisfy Arab territorial demands would endanger the existence of the Jewish state and clearly infringe the oft-repeated moral commitment to its survival. Besides, if Israel submits to this pressure, becomes indefensible and war breaks out, the failure of the United States to intervene militarily on its behalf would seriously undermine Washington's credibility and standing in the international arena. In other words, Israeli territorial concessions cannot be an unqualified advantage from the American viewpoint and maintaining the status quo may in the long run serve US interests better.
The above in no way contradicts the obvious fact that the United States has vital strategic interests in the Middle East and elsewhere far more important than Israel's security or survival. Within its 1967-1979 borders, Israel was a significant regional power. When Menahem Begin made the historic mistake of yielding to President Carter's pressure and ceded the entire Sinai Peninsula to Egypt, Israel's strategic importance decreased sharply, while Egypt's rose no less sharply. Israel's "reward" for signing this peace treaty was that during the last two decades the United States focused on Egypt as its most important strategic asset in the Eastern Mediterranean. The demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 underscored the rapidly diminishing importance of Israel as a strategic US asset. Moreover, without the Sinai Peninsula and the territories already yielded to the PLO the Oslo Accords of 1993, Israel's ability to defend itself is uncertain. Ceding the Golan Heights to Syria would deal it a mortal blow.
US Military Prospects in the Middle East
American battlefield tactics emphasize high-tech weapons, including last generation missiles, manned aircraft and drones, C³ communication, electronic sensors and instantaneous computerized battlefield information. But there is another school of thought advocating the use of well trained, highly motivated troops operating in small, mobile units and prepared to engage the enemy at close quarters with appropriate infantry weapons. The indications are that determined enemy forces of the latter type, employing deadly and protracted terrorist tactics, are what the US would probably face if it permits itself to be again involved in Middle East conflicts.
Examples of the effective use of high performance weaponry avoiding the risk of significant casualties were the 1991 Gulf War and the recent Kosovo confrontation with Serbia. In both cases the latest technology in weaponry was used to overcome enemy resistance. However, Saddam Hussein is still in power in Iraq and during the 1999 Kosovo conflict little damage was inflicted on Serbian military assets. Had the Serbs persevered a little longer, the United States might have been forced to employ substantial ground forces.
The failure of high-tech weaponry to defeat a determined enemy was certainly the US experience in Viet Nam. More recently, US forces staged humiliating withdrawals from Lebanon after suffering heavy casualties at the hands of Arab terrorists backed by Syria and from Somalia, where they were attacked by local Moslem militias. The reputation of the seemingly powerful Israeli army was also badly dented by its hurried withdrawal from Lebanon in the face of a few hundred Hezbollah guerrillas. Yet in all these cases the failure was more of political will under internal and external pressures than of the modern weapons.
No foreseeable enemy in the Middle East will attempt to engage US forces on the basis of tank for tank, aircraft for aircraft, artillery piece for artillery piece or even trained soldier for trained soldier. The enemy will probably consist of highly dispersed, mobile forces, well equipped for their harassing missions. The dedicated guerillas and terrorists ready to die for their cause existing in this region are able to blend in with the local civilian population and may eventually prevail. The likelihood that they will prevail increases in direct ratio to the unwillingness of Western politicians and military commanders to inflict heavy casualties on them or the populations protecting them. Superior weapons are still an important factor, but only when the readiness to use them ruthlessly and effectively exists. The West has never used them against Moslems in this manner, though it was utterly ruthless, killing hundreds of thousands of German civilians, when it blanket-bombed Berlin, Hamburg, Dresden, Cologne and other German cities in 1944-45 to shorten World War II, finishing the job with nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It gained crucial strategic goals in the process, including 50 years of pacifism in both Germany and Japan.
Caspar Weinberger's retreat from Lebanon in 1984 after Syria's Islamic fundamentalist proxies murdered nearly 300 American marines became the inspiration of Islamic terrorism the world over, creating an existential danger not only to Israel but also to Western hegemony in the Middle East in the 21st century. It was an act motivated by pandering to oil interests and the advice of Saudi Arabia. Yet blanket-bombing Damascus and Lattakia would have been far more effective in assuring the long-term loyalty of Saudi Arabia and the Moslem world to Western interests. Guerilla wars cannot be won without readiness to incur some casualties and a very strong will to win whatever the cost to the enemy.
Conclusion
The strategic importance of the vast petroleum reserves in the Middle East and its vital sea lanes requires the United States to consider this region carefully when formulating its foreign policy and economic decisions. These considerations should include awareness of the continuous proclivity for violence and fierce hatred of Western culture endemic to the Moslems living in the region.
In the 21st century Middle East, the Arab/Israel dispute will probably remain the most persistent flashpoint, despite continued attempts to paper over this deep-seated conflict with peace treaties and ad hoc agreements. All the Arab states are dictatorships manifesting varying degrees of repression and brutality towards their own populations. Arab enmity to the Jewish state combines an explosive mix of nationalism and religious fundamentalism. Under these circumstances, the United States must not allow itself to become too deeply involved. Except where its vital interests are directly and immediately concerned, its best policy would be one of gradual disengagement and benign neglect, while exerting its influence to prevent other powers from intervening. Contrary to the traditional mantra, only the governments and people of the region can find or implement a lasting solution to its problems.
However, for the present there is no indication that any solution permitting a viable Israel to exist is acceptable to the Arab side. This being so, Israel should not be prevented from defending itself against Islamic terrorism and/or Arab aggression by any means it deems necessary during the crucial short period until the terrorists or rogue Moslem governments obtain nuclear weapons. The more complete the Israeli victory, the stronger will be the US position in the region. The mistake of the West was to reward Arab terrorism with concessions and retreats, creating a Frankenstein monster that may devour its oil if Weinberger's policies become the model for the future.
Bibliography
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- API Reports, American Petroleum Institute, Fall 2000.
- A Proposed Solution to the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Irving Kett, LTC, US Army War College 1974.
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- Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East, Kemp, Geoffrey, Harkavy, Robert Brookings Institution Press, 1997.
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- United States Military Posture, Moorer, Thomas H., Admiral US Navy, Testimony before the US Senate Armed Services Committee, 1975.
- http://www.energy.gov
