Asia's Changing Geopolitics
A Challenge to US Global Power Status

Dr. Dinesh Kumar

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The 21st has begun with every important state in Asia undergoing profound political, economic and strategic changes: China and India are rising, despite their economic difficulties, Japan is gradually recovering its past political and military importance, the Koreans are engaged in a diplomatic dialogue of historic significance, Russia is trying to reassert its presence on the continent, and Indonesia is struggling to hold herself together. These developments have seriously strained the existing balance of power in Asia and are posing many challenges for the major status quo power there - the United States.

American prosperity largely depends on trade with Asia and US economic power - on controlling a sizeable proportion of the energy and raw materials from this continent. Simultaneously, Asia poses the gravest challenges to world peace and security and its destabilizing forces increasingly active. So policymakers in Washington realize that the future of the United States as a global power is closely tied to the nature and intensity of its engagement in Asia.

To meet the above challenges, Washington plans to introduce Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) in Asia and has strengthened the existing bilateral alliances in the region, encouraging their expansion by promoting multilateral institutional frameworks (Asian Security Communities) despite strenuous opposition from the rising superpower of the region - China. The conflicting interests of regional states increase Washington's difficulties.

This background explains last year's decisive shift of the focus of US global strategy to Asia after a protracted period of preoccupation with Europe, NATO expansion and operations in Bosnia and Kosovo.

The importance of Asia is certain to increase in the 21st century. The basic ingredients for its political and economic development exist. Some of its governments are committed to rapid growth, gradual transition to democratic political systems, education for their citizens and the introduction of advanced technologies better and foreign capital.

Presently, Asia accounts for over a quarter of the world's GDP. More than half a million US citizens, not including troops, live, work and study there. The volume of US trade with Asia reaches $500 billion. The volume of US investment in Asia is $150 billion. Millions of American workers benefit from jobs sustained by trade with Asia as do small and large American investors. US economic interests in Asia will continue to expand if the dynamism of the continent's recent past is any indication of its future.

However, peace and stability in Asia are very vulnerable. Strong historical rivalries and widespread mistrust between the major states are accompanied by growing internal strife. Asia remains one the most volatile places on earth. The unresolved problems of Taiwan, Korea, and Kashmir could trigger a major international crisis overnight. Weapon proliferation, drug trafficking, terrorism, and piracy further complicate the security problems.

Three major Asian powers - China, Japan and India - are dissatisfied with their current international status and are seeking a greater role in any future economic or security structure in Asia. The ongoing strategic uncertainty has led many states to pursue ambitious diplomatic and military initiatives. China is pushing forward its strategic agenda, which clashes with US global strategy. Japan and India are formulating new approaches to regional security. The Korean peninsula faces the prospects of major changes; ASEAN member states are emerging from their economic difficulties and the important Southeast Asian state, Indonesia, is facing serious dangers of disintegration.

The US seems contented with the status quo, but is aware that the changes going on in Asia will make it difficult to sustain. US Assistant Secretary [of State?] James Kelly warned in his confirmation hearing remarks that in view of the successes, failures and complexities brought to Asia by technology, prosperity and political development, US policies can be effective only when "firm in goals but flexible in tactics."

American economic interests in Asia are closely linked to its security interests on the continent. Indeed, US security commitments have carved out a significant economic space for the United States in Asia. The major US strategic engagement is crucial not only to protect allies and ensure peace and stability but also to safeguard American economic interests.

The latest Quadrennial Defense Review Report (published in October 2001) "formally" recommends shifting the focus and forces of US military power away from Europe and the Atlantic towards Asia and the Pacific. The report seeks to sharpen US military operations in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Command, comments, "In the past - I've been looking at defense reviews for a long time - 'Big Three' regions have always been Europe, Southwest Asia and East Asia, in that order. Now you find that East Asia comes first, Southwest Asia second and Europe third."

Thus, notwithstanding the present US priority to the war against terrorism, this report argues that the focus of its global strategy in the 21st century will be on Asia.


After World War II, the United States, one of the two superpowers involved in almost all political disputes in Asia, fought three major wars there. When the Cold War ended, voices were heard in the US that Washington should disengage from Asia and other parts of the world. However, these voices made little impact. The US leadership cannot escape from dealing with the emerging challenges in Asia unless it is prepared to allow its global power status to be undermined. Defending America's military involvement abroad, in 1997, then Defense Secretary William Cohen argued, "Today, there are some who would have us pull back from the world, forgetting the central lesson of this century: that when America neglects the problems of the world, the world often brings its problems to America's doorstep."

Despite some calls for isolationism, the US remained the most important military power in Asia after the end of the Cold War. Indeed, since the mid-1990s, Washington has strengthened bilateral defense ties with most of the countries in the region, and, in consequence, its activities and training in Asia have increased substantially. The US has formal bilateral military alliances with many Asian states, including the Philippines, Thailand, Japan, and South Korea. Some 100,000 US troops are based in Japan (48,000) and South Koreas (37,000), with the rest in Guam or elsewhere.

Pentagon sources claim that the increased military activities in Asia are because "that is where the action is going to be in the future." It took a while for the US military to fully appreciate the challenge and potential of the mission to preserve peace and stability in Asia. The US Asia-Pacific security strategy has three main objectives:

  1. To enhance American security with effective diplomacy and with military forces that are ready to fight and win.
  2. To bolster America's economic prosperity.
  3. To promote democracy in Asia.
By pursuing these objectives, the US seeks to promote a stable, secure, prosperous and peaceful Asia where it remains a dominant player, partner, and beneficiary. It wants to prevent or deter threats through diplomacy, international assistance, arms control programmes, non-proliferation initiatives, and overseas military presence, as well as to maintain its ability to defuse potential crises and to win wars.

However, Washington is increasingly worried that the above American strategy may not meet the challenges posed by the rapid changes on the Asian continent in the medium and long-term. If this strategy were to fail, the Pentagon is unclear about what would replace it and how security or stability would be maintained in the region for the next few decades.

In the absence of any credible NATO-type multilateral military institutions in Asia while opposition to the US military presence in Japan and Korea is mounting for a variety of domestic and regional reasons, there is a growing feeling in Washington that the US should develop a more refined process for assessing the strategic significance of events in Asia and deciding upon the relative importance of possible military and economic responses to developments likely to affect Asia's strategic, economic, and political future. The US strategic vision in Asia now includes a new concept: Asian Security Community.

In the longer term, as the defense capabilities of the regional states grow, the Pentagon wants to gradually transform its balance-of-power approach in the Asia-Pacific region into one that aims to produce security communities where disputes are not resolved by threats or the employment of force.

To this end, the US is actively promoting cooperation on shared security interests in the region. It is not particularly anxious to form a multilateral NATO-type alliance - a difficult task in the light of the ongoing ethnic, border and trans-national conflicts in the region. Washington is also trying to merge bilateral exercises into regional exercises by involving several participants. To improve dialogue with and among the regional states, the US Pacific Command is organizing many multinational conferences (including an annual conference bringing together the defense chiefs of the region), workshops, and courses. Officials in Washington believe that this approach will help to dilute the US image as a "hegemonic power" in Asia.

In this context, Washington has been working to strengthen the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and supported the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). It introduced multilateral military activities of a type already existing in these forums. The Cobra Gold exercises, which include Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, and Singapore (China and Vietnam were invited to send observers), have a similar goal. Admiral Dennis Blair aims to expand the scope of the multilateral military exercises further by actively promoting multilateral initiatives in spheres such as peacekeeping, piracy prevention, drug interdiction, and disaster relief.

Despite the time and resources devoted to the promotion of the concept of "Asian Security Community", it has not so far received a good response from the states of the region. Their colonial background and bitter bilateral differences make most Asian states hesitant to enter any form of multilateral security arrangement. Except for the limited India-Pakistan war in Kargil in 1999, the nuclear proliferation crisis between Washington and Pyongyang in 1994 and the 1996 Chinese missile tests near Taiwan's territorial waters, there was no major military crisis in Asia during the last decade, so there is no feeling of urgency to build new regional mechanisms and institutions.

This makes peace and stability in Asia heavily dependent on the forward deployment of American troops and US bilateral security arrangements with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines. No country seems satisfied with the status quo, but as there is no concrete alternative it has become a necessary evil.

Another major strategic US initiative to deal with the emerging dangers in Asia is the plan to develop a missile defense system. The Pentagon has justified the introduction of Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) in the Asia-Pacific region by the need to meet the threat of non-conventional weapons from rogue states, especially North Korea. But TMD would also protect the US and its regional allies (e.g. Japan) from Chinese missile attacks.

The Bush administration's announcement that the US is committed to a missile defense system has added more uncertainties in the region, as China and Russia regard such a shield contrary to their strategic interests. The planned missile shield system, according to their perception, will destroy the nuclear arms control regime, giving Washington a decisive military advantage over them. Beijing fears that the system would eventually be adapted to defend Taiwan from Chinese missiles, which would further delay Beijing's agenda of unifying the "renegade province" with the mainland.

The TMD decision has been criticised as yet another example of "US unilateralism" after Washington withdrew from the Kyoto Accord on the environment. To pacify the critics and garner support from other nations, President Bush has promised "real consultations" about the nature of America's future missile defense system. Many senior US officials have visited Europe and Asia to discuss the issue and collect feedback.

Russia's readiness to hear US views on the missile defense issue has alarmed China, as it fears Moscow's opposition to missile defense might be softening. It is therefore seeking reassurance and guarantees from Moscow in this regard. Recently, China hinted that it is ready to hold "serious" talks with the United States on missile defense, but, simultaneously, reiterated its opposition: "We are opposed to the building of a missile defense system… Like many countries, we are worried that this action will have a serious negative influence detrimental to global strategic stability."

• Part 2: The Chinese Challenge
• Part 3: The Korean Enigma
• Part 4: The Washington-Tokyo Alliance
• Part 5: ASEAN and US Cooperation with Southeast Asia
• Part 6: South Asia / Conclusion

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