Three major crises have converged on the Arab world at once, jeopardizing the future of Iraq, Palestine and Arab-Islamic culture. Iraq faces destruction and the possibility of direct occupation; the Palestinians' cause has been marginalized. And Arab-Islamic culture is no longer merely the object of a campaign of distortion and vilification, but of an offensive to change or break it at gunpoint. These three crises appear so intertwined as to have melded into one massive crisis that threatens to overwhelm the Arab order and tear it from its foundations.
It is important to understand the mechanisms that brought this about. Arab-Islamic culture has been under assault for centuries - perhaps since the Ottoman occupation of portions of Europe. Palestine has been progressively raped since the birth of the Zionist movement at the turn of the 20th century. The Iraqi people have been reeling under sanctions now for just over a decade. The disparity in the starting points of these crises might be taken as proof that they have different causes and motivations. However, a discerning observer can easily detect the fine thread connecting seemingly disparate beads into a harmonious necklace - the events of 11th September 2001.
Fate destined that the horror of September 11th occurred only months after the most conservative administration in US history attained power and within months of the "election" of a war criminal as Israeli Prime Minister. This coincidence helped to eliminate obstacles that had prevented the US and Israel from reaching a joint vision of a "new" Middle East. The US has always been unreservedly pro-Israeli. However, US-Israeli relations underwent a profound transformation with the arrival of Bush Junior to the White House heading a team of fundamentalist Christians who believe that the realization of Greater Israel is a prerequisite for the return of Christ. For the first time in the history of US-Israeli relations, the US administration's attitudes toward Israel were governed by creed rather than by pragmatism. Given the presence of an ultra-right Israel Government that believes absolutely in creating Greater Israel, it was natural that the visions of Washington and Tel Aviv would converge and the policies of the former would be subordinated to those of the latter.
Against this backdrop, the most fanatical and most pro-Israeli political forces in the US succeeded in exploiting the events of 11th September to compel the US administration to adopt a Middle East policy with the following premises. First, the attacks were the product of the cultural-political situation in the Arab world characterized by endemic despotism and corruption. To forestall a repeat of 11 September required a radical long-term remedy.
Second, the remedy should be administered to all Arab countries -- including those claiming to be on friendly terms with the US. Heading the list, here, are Egypt and Saudi Arabia, considered breeding grounds for terrorism because all 19 alleged perpetrators of 11 September were Arab Muslims, of whom 15 were from Saudi Arabia and one from Egypt.
Third, this remedy will not be effective until all paramilitary organisations espousing an Islamist ideology, in general, and fundamentalist beliefs, in particular, are eliminated. They are, without distinction, terrorist organisations that kill civilians. There are no shades of difference between them, whether they call themselves Al-Qa'eda, Hamas, the Palestinian Jihad or Hizbullah, and whether or not they hide behind the banner of resistance against Israeli occupation.
On the basis of these tendentious and easily refutable premises, the proponents of the US's new Middle East philosophy figured that the best way to implement it was to invade and occupy Iraq for a limited period. After all, toppling Saddam was an objective that some Arab regimes would welcome and might even be willing to participate in realizing. Disarming Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction, which it should have destroyed under UN Security Council resolutions, would furnish the necessary pretext for obtaining the gloss of international legitimacy for a military campaign leading to direct occupation. This, in turn, was to pave the way for change throughout the region via a sort of domino effect. Once Washington is in place in Baghdad, Israel could proceed to eliminate the "terrorist" organisations in Palestine and Lebanon, while US forces in Iraq could keep Syria and Iran at bay should they attempt to intervene on behalf of those organisations. Indeed, Washington may well welcome any such action on the part of Tehran or Damascus, for it would serve as a pretext to effect regime change in those countries as well. Meanwhile, Iraq, a major Arab country with abundant natural and human resources and a unique ethnic and confessional configuration, would make the perfect test case for the type of democratic system Washington would like to see in the region: a decentralized government with only the weakest allegiance - if any - to Arabism and political Islam.
In spite of the indications that Washington's vision for a new Middle East has evolved from vague musings into a concrete plan of action supported by the most influential wing in the US administration, Arab officialdom behaves as though it were in a coma. Governments in the region are divided in their approach to the crisis. Some harbor such a hatred for the Iraqi regime that they appear ready for a pact with the devil himself to eradicate it. Others have surrendered to the inevitable and now seem to be scrambling for ways to save face and/or ways to reap some compensation for war losses. A third group is trying to capitalize on popular sentiment, with little concern as to whether this strategy has the potential to influence events. Not surprisingly, these approaches clashed and so far have produced a big zero.
Thus the Arab order appears a burden on all. It cannot risk being seen to support the US-led war; nor can it offer substantial support to its French-led opponents. Moreover, some Arab states had long accepted, or been coerced into accepting, US bases on their land and are offering their services for the war virtually free of charge in spite of the enormous political costs they will pay. In short, all now stand to lose: participants, bystanders and opportunistic slogan- mongers.
The Arab order was unable to prevent a war on Iraq. It still appears incapable of promoting a just settlement to the Palestinian cause; indeed, of preventing the destruction of that cause. It has even been incapable of defending Arab and Muslim identity and culture. Seemingly, the only course open to it now is to give way to a new, alternative order that must inevitably emerge from the ruins of the one about to collapse.
The US might be able to occupy Iraq and change its regime. It might be able to deliver stinging blows to Hamas, Jihad and Hizbullah. It might be able to change the regime in Syria and, perhaps, other countries in order to pave the way for a Greater Israel. Yet Washington should realize that these "achievements" - should they come about - would only hasten the death of an already moribund official Arab order. The Arab people will not surrender. From the heart of their resistance hope will emerge. And I doubt very much whether many tears will be shed over the old order, which will hopefully be replaced by one that ushers in a true Arab revival.
Comment: Fierce hostility to the United States and resistance to US policies for the Middle East characterize this impassioned plea for "true" Arabism, a fine example of the distorted mirror Arabs use to view historical events. Arab states ready to help the US war against Iraq (presumably Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Jordan) are "ready for a pact with the devil himself" - a somewhat unkind description of the power that has kept Egypt afloat with economic aid and supplies it with arms on very favorable terms.However, if the US is a devil, it is clearly, in the author's opinion, only the "little Satan." The "great Satan" is Israel, to whose policies American policies are "subordinated." Israel, which in 1948 "occupied" most of Palestine (why mention that it was attacked without provocation by Egypt and four other Arab states); Israel, which in 1967 occupied the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights and the rest of Western Palestine (after Egypt massed forces in Sinai and proclaimed it would drive the Jews into the sea - and Jordan attacked West Jerusalem); Israel, whose Prime Minister was not elected but "elected" and is a "war criminal" because he defeated the Egyptians in yet another war they started in 1973 and did NOT kill Palestinian refugees in the Sabra and Shatila camps of Lebanon (this was done by Eli Hobeike, a Christian Phalange commander who sold out to Syria).
So the author is troubled by the failure of the United States to understand that Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hizbullah, who kill Jews, are not terrorists like Al-Qa'eda. Let him be reminded that - even on the assumption that Jews are not human - Arafat's Fatah killed two US diplomats in the Sudan, Hizbullah participated in at least one terrorist outrage in Saudi Arabia that killed many Americans, besides killing more Christians than Jews when it blew up Israel's Embassy in Buenos Aires, while Hamas and the Islamic Jihad have killed many Israeli Arabs with their suicide bombers in Israel.
Saddam Hussein's Iraq is described as "a major Arab country with abundant natural and human resources and a unique ethnic and confessional configuration," which the US would like to turn into "a decentralized government with only the weakest allegiance - if any - to Arabism and political Islam." The author, needless to say, has no sympathies for Kurdish aspirations to autonomy or independence. Kurds may be Moslems, but they are not Palestinians. They are not even Arabs. Nor does he seem concerned about a Sunni Arab minority representing less than a quarter of Iraq's population ruling a Shiite majority more than twice as large. But is another Sunni Arab dictatorship ruling Kurds and Shiites what most Iraqis want or need?
Neither the United States nor any non-Moslem should be interested in promoting "Arabism and political Islam", which too often have been a synonym for Moslem expansionism. Syria's conquest of Lebanon and destruction of the Christian power structure there are a good example. So are Moslem attempts to dislodge Christians in Nigeria, Sudan and the Philippine Republic or Hindus in Kashmir. But political Islam also wages its battles on the demographic front, sometimes simply by immigration or conversions. It has made big gains in Western Europe and the United States - and internal security in these countries has become more difficult to maintain as a result. Saudi Arabia has contributed to these problems by financing the infrastructure of Islam - mosques and other religious requirements, though some Saudi money has found its way to terrorist bodies too.
Yet the most important thing about this article is that it is one of very, very many throughout the Arab world viciously attacking the United States. The hatred it reflects is real and cannot be checked by anything the Americans can do. It is a hatred of Western values as much or more than of Western acts.
