Until recently, despite their traditional and historical ties, India and Iran remained strategic adversaries. India viewed Iran through the Pakistan prism. Iran, claiming a special role as leader of Islamic states, was one of the strongest critics of Hindu-dominated India. However, over the last decade, the two countries found several important issues on which their interests began to converge:
- Both India and Iran oppose the Taleban regime in Afghanistan and share concerns about the growing instability it foments in Central Asia.
- Lacking direct access to the Central Asian republics, India sees Iran as a useful gateway to the markets and natural resources of that region.
- By developing close ties with Iran - an important Moslem state - India hopes to neutralize the Pakistani propaganda on Kashmir.
- On the other hand, Iran hopes to break its international isolation by befriending India.
- Iran, one of world's biggest producers of natural gas, can find a ready market in India.
- India's expertise in information technology is another field where Teheran expects to benefit from closer ties with New Delhi.
- Finally, Iran seeks close cooperation in the sphere of defense with India in order to meet the requirements of its armed forces, but also with the intention of forming a bloc against Western interests in the region.
Their perception of converging political and economic interests led Iran's President Mohammed Khatami and India's Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to sign the Teheran Declaration at the conclusion of Vajpayee's state visit to Iran. Stressing their common views on the situation in Afghanistan, they condemned terrorism in all its forms. They agreed to launch a new phase of constructive and mutually beneficial cooperation in the spheres of industry, agriculture and transportation, as well as in the service sector. In order to reactivate joint Indo-Iranian projects, Vajpayee offered Iran a $200 million credit line. Khatami promised to take India's sensivities on the Kashmir issue into consideration.
Prospects of Military Cooperation
Teheran is considering a 5-year military modernization plan and therefore wants to build up its defense capabilities by using the potential of regional states, including India. The Supreme Religious Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, told Prime Minister Vajpayee that, in the current global situation, it was necessary to expand the ties between Iran, India, China and Russia. Significantly, during Indian Defense Secretary Yogendra Narain's visit to Teheran in March 2001, Iran's Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani also stressed the need for cooperation in defense matters.
Consequently, the two states have initiated a security dialogue on major developments in their region and elsewhere in the world. At this time, according to our sources, Iran-India defense ties focus mainly on research and cooperation in the spheres of industry and technology. This is in line with their program of modernizing their defense industries. The sources also claim that some Iranian defense personnel are receiving military training in India and talks are underway about joint weapons development. Moreover, India has indicated readiness to sell some military hardware to Iran.
However, despite their mutual interests and numerous initiatives to improve relations, there are limits to Teheran and New Delhi becoming close strategic allies - especially as regards the transfer of sophisticated technology and weapons. Despite the current bonhomie, there still exists a lot of mistrust between the leaders of the two countries, as the majority of the Iranian leadership is still wary of a strong Hindu-dominated India, while New Delhi views an influential Islamic Iran as a potential adversary in the long run. This is the main reason why many of the agreements previously signed have not been implemented.
It would not be in India's interest to sell advanced technology and/or weapons to Iran, as this would adversely affect its relations with other Asian states (particularly Moslem Iraq and Saudi Arabia), which are equally important from India's strategic viewpoint. Such a move would also jeopardize India's strong strategic ties with Israel and strain its relations with the United States.
The US State Department is watching New Delhi's ongoing contacts with Teheran closely and has expressed grave concern about the prospect of Indo-Iranian defense cooperation. According to the same sources, India's Minister of Defense and Foreign Affairs, Jaswant Singh, assured Secretary of State Colin Powell during his recent visit to Washington that India would do nothing that might disturb the delicate military balance in the volatile Persian Gulf region. In return, in view of the recent standoff between the US and China and in order to prevent a rapprochement between New Delhi and the emerging Moscow-Beijing-Teheran axis, US policymakers are feeling the necessity to develop strong strategic ties with India. It would be foolish from India's standpoint to risk precluding a strategic partnership with the US and Israel by opting for one with Iran.
Many Indian strategists warn that, despite the liberalization process Iran underwent under Khatami, it would be an error to assume that, if reelected, he will be another Gorbachev. They emphasize that, despite the current convergence of political and economic interests, Iran may become a major threat to India's security if the Islamic fundamentalists retain their influence on policymaking. It is also feared that, when the Afghanistan problem subsides, an Iran-Pakistan axis may reemerge against India. This concern is the major reason preventing Indian consent to a pipeline transporting natural gas from Iran to India via Pakistan.
Thus, despite the high-level contacts, expectations on both sides are low. The current phase of Indo-Iranian rapprochement must be seen as seeking short-term tactical gains rather than as a reflection of converging long-term interests.
