The attempts to find a solution to the India-Pakistan conflict have seen so many false starts that it is difficult to be hopeful about any new venture. After their bitter and bloody history, the more recent occurrence of the Kargil conflict against the backdrop of the Lahore peace initiative in 1999 and the failure of the much-hyped Agra summit in July 2001 increased the cynicism over the chances for peace between the two nuclear neighbors. However, the latest peace initiative that commenced with Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee’s visit to Pakistan in January 2004 was followed by positive responses from some Kashmiri leaders and a more flexible attitude by Pakistan. This introduced a new reality and optimism in the region. The India-Pakistan conflict, centered on the Kashmir issue, has been one of the oldest, intractable conflicts of the post-World War II period. During the Cold War era, with India in the Soviet bloc and Pakistan in the Western bloc, the conflict was confined to regional level, despite causing huge loss of human lives and squandering scarce resources on the participating armed forces in one of the poorest regions of the world. Such was the neglect of the India-Pakistan dispute by major world powers that even three wars and the bloody insurgency in Kashmir, which began in 1989 and has reportedly claimed over 60,000 lives, failed to bring the issue to the top of the global agenda.
The optimism stems from the fact that, for the first time in the history of the five-decade old India-Pakistan conflict, all three major parties involved – the Kashmiris, Pakistan, and India - have softened their stands on the Kashmir issue and are beginning to regard peace as a possible and desirable objective. The change in their attitudes promises considerable benefits for everyone concerned, if the thaw can last and ultimately lead to peaceful relations.
Becoming a nuclear flash point
Given the decades of hostilities, the mindless killings in Kashmir by militants and the unwillingness of leaderships in Delhi and Islamabad to step back from their rigid positions, nobody expected quick and smooth results. The Lahore bus initiative of Vajpayee ended with the Kargil conflict a few months later. The Vajpayee-Musharraf Agra summit (July 2001) turned out to be a major fiasco. These non-starters clearly demonstrated the difficulties and complexities of dealing with the Kashmir issue.
Then came the terror attacks in New York and Washington DC on 11 th September 2001, which drastically changed the global strategic landscape. Fighting terrorism became the chief global agenda. Seeing the writing on the wall, Pakistan – once nearly branded a terrorist state – quickly turned into a frontline state in the US-led war against the Taleban and Al-Qaeda terror network. However, the Pakistani government did not do much to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure within its territory, which had been responsible for the deadly terrorist attacks in Indian administered Kashmir.
Three months later, Kashmiri militants, whose ranks had been infiltrated by foreign jehadi fighters, stormed into the Indian Parliament. Blaming this terrorist attack on Pakistan, India mobilized its troops along the LOC and demanded that Islamabad hand over the masterminds of the attack to Delhi. India also threatened to take direct action herself if Pakistan failed to destroy the terrorist training camps on its territory. Both countries had mobilized over one million troops along the LOC and had put their war machinery at the highest level of preparedness. How fragile and dangerous the India-Pakistan dispute remained was highlighted by the fact that just over two years after the Kargil crisis was defused, both countries were again on the brink of war.
Given the asymmetry in the two countries’ conventional military strength, Pakistan’s officials and military commanders openly spoke of using the nuclear option if its security was threatened. As the nuclear war clouds loomed large above the sub-continent, world leaders once again launched diplomatic initiatives to de-escalate the situation. Though the crisis was successfully averted, both East and West were now convinced that the two nuclear neighbors needed to improve their relations if grave dangers were to be avoided in the near future. Since then, there have been concerted efforts from the international community, especially by the United States, to bring Delhi and Islamabad back to the negotiating table.
Meanwhile, the leaderships in India and Pakistan also began to realize that a confrontationist attitude not only threatened security but also gravely affected their efforts to develop their states.
From conflict to cooperation
Learning the lessons of the ill-fated Agra Summit, India and Pakistan again engaged in intensive diplomacy, often secretly, in preparation for reviving the peace process. The new peace initiative started in November 2003 with a ceasefire along the LOC between the Indian and Pakistani troops, which remarkably is still holding. During Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to Pakistan in January 2004, the two sides agreed on a formula that called for an end to militancy in Kashmir and talks on the divided state, giving a decisive push to the peace process. Since then, several rounds of talks have taken place between the two countries; issues have been thrashed out and a common lexicon started slowly evolving. The following developments demonstrate how the India-Pakistan equation has changed in recent months.
Personal contacts supported by both governments have created a support base across the political spectrum. India and Pakistan restored some of road and air travel links and their cricket teams have once again started playing each other. The two governments have also agreed to reopen consulates in Bombay and Karachi. More contacts between families separated by the partition of Kashmir in 1947-48 will be initiated.
With the reactivation of Joint Economic Commission, trade between the two countries may expand considerably in the coming years, especially if the Trade Secretaries of India and Pakistan make substantial progress during their upcoming (August 9th) discussions on the issue of according most favored nation (MFN) status to each other. It is not without significance that at a recent meeting of a Joint Working Group, India and Pakistan showed interest in jointly launching the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project, which even under the current relatively favorable circumstances seems very ambitious.
Delhi and Islamabad have made a good progress in the field of defense and security as well. Recently they upgraded the hotline to the top military level of Director General of Military Operations. High-level discussions were also held on touchy issues like Sir Creek and Siachen, with the aim of finding mutually acceptable solutions. Officials from the two countries are also scheduled to hold nuclear talks in the first week of August in Delhi.
Against the backdrop of these encouraging developments, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf met in Delhi in April earlier this year, reiterating their respective governments’ commitment to peace and friendship with each other. While stressing that the redrawing of boundaries was not possible, Singh called for greater movement of people and goods across the LOC, which would create an atmosphere of mutual trust between the two countries. Musharraf's remarks that he would not allow terrorism to “impede” the peace process have helped to create confidence in Delhi about Pakistan’s intentions. However, though he ruled out a military option, Musharraf warned that Kashmir remained a flashpoint.
The two leaders held substantive talks on various issues and declared in a joint statement that the peace process was now irreversible. They agreed to continue their discussions in a “sincere, purposeful and forward-looking manner to bring the benefits of peace to the people of our two countries and, in particular, the people of Jammu and Kashmir.” They also pledged to work towards a “soft border” between the two parts of Kashmir, opening more meeting points for divided families and boosting trade and travel across the border.
Causes of the rapprochement
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf moderated his stand on Kashmir and agreed to improve relations with India without first settling the Kashmir dispute – a long-held position of Islamabad. Yet the Indian leadership now trusts Musharraf’s intentions, despite his past support to the militants and, more significantly, his own role in the Kargil crisis. What is behind these peace efforts? Can they lead to a solution ending the sub-continent’s status as the nuclear flashpoint of the 21st century?
Disillusioned Kashmiris
After sixteen years of insurgency, the Kashmiri population is tired and disillusioned with the secessionist leadership. This has shifted the trend of public opinion to favor of a restoration of normality. The militant groups are finding it difficult to ignore the popular mood in the valley, especially when they are dependent on local support.
Pakistan’s military humiliation in Kargil (1999) made the Kashmiri militants realize that neither foreign mercenaries nor the Pakistani army are capable of changing the status quo in Kashmir by force. Kashmiri militants also understand that in the post-9/11 era, Pakistan is not in a position to support their cause militarily as it used to do in the past. They are also wary of the increasing hold of the foreign Islamic fighters in the valley, whose hardcore jehadi agenda and mindless killings have done serious harm to the Kashmiri struggle’s image in the eyes of the international community.
The attraction of joining Pakistan is no longer widely shared by the Kashmiris as Pakistan sinks deeper into political and sectarian chaos under the military regime and faces growing Islamic fundamentalism. Kashmiris may not regard India as a desired partner, but there is little affection between them and the leaders of Pakistan too. This has been increasing the pressure on Kashmiri separatists to respond positively to the new peace initiatives.
Pakistan’s fear of losing Kashmir
Leaders in Pakistan are becoming increasingly wary of “Kashmiri sentiments” since the Kashmiri leaders in recent years have openly advocated the total freedom of Kashmir, rather than its accession to Pakistan. They suspect that if Kashmir gains full independence, it would be more inclined towards India, harming Pakistan’s long-term strategic interests. Feedback in Islamabad from the recent people-to-people exchanges reportedly indicates that the pro-Pakistan constituency in Kashmir is much smaller than officials in Islamabad believed. The view of some All Party Hurriyet Conference (APHC) leaders that India would lead South Asia after the resolution of the Kashmir issue was another major blow to Pakistan’s Kashmir policy.
Pakistan cannot afford to lose control over its side of Kashmir, as it is not only strategically important but also contains the country’s main sources of water. In addition, such a development might boost the rising liberation movements in Baluchistan and the growing unrest in Sindh. A peaceful settlement with India would certainly ensure that Pakistan would retain control of the part of Kashmir it currently administers.
India’s changed perspective
During the last decade, fighting the insurgency in Kashmir and monitoring the LOC have consumed a large proportion of Indian defense resources, adversely affecting the modernization plans of its armed forces. The renewed insurgency in India’s northeastern states put an additional burden on scarce military resources. Like Pakistan, India cannot afford to see Kashmir becoming an independent (Muslim) country, not least because such an outcome might provoke other Indian Muslims (who number some 140 million) as well as other minorities to secede from India, leading to the Balkanization of the country.
Kashmir is not only rich in minerals and agriculture, it is also strategically positioned on the borders of Pakistan, Russia, China, and Afghanistan. The Indian government hopes that it might face less international pressure to deal with human-rights abuses and to cap its nuclear program if its relations with Pakistan improve and peace in Kashmir becomes a reality. Many strategists in Delhi think that India should end its regional disputes if it wishes to become a great power in the 21st century.
Geopolitical changes
In the post-9/11 era, the use of violence for political objectives has become less tenable and less profitable. Delhi has chided the Western capitals for their double standards on terrorism, and many world leaders now question the Pakistani policy of a proxy war against India by supporting militant groups in Kashmir. Washington, Pakistan’s major ally, seems to have quietly persuaded Musharraf to adopt a flexible position on Kashmir and accept a peace process with India, as such a step would be in his own interests, as well as in the interests of his country. Given the continuous improvement in India-China relations in recent years, it would not be surprising if China conveyed a similar message to Islamabad. Against such an unfavorable background, the Pakistani leadership may well have come to the conclusion that peaceful and cooperative relations with India are a better option than the use of force.
Benefits of peace
Normal and friendly ties between India and Pakistan have the potential of bringing rich dividends to both sides, even without a final resolution of the territorial dispute over Kashmir. The likely rewards for Pakistan would be largely in the economic sphere. India’s benefits would be of a political nature, enhancing Delhi's international standing considerably.
Peace with India will help Pakistan to reduce its military spending, which currently accounts for approximately 25% of the total government budget. Money previously spent on arms and maintaining a strong standing army of half a million men could be utilized for economic development. These savings could also be used to attain better fiscal balances that would reduce Pakistan’s big debt burden and improve its credit rating. Pakistan would also have the option of benefiting from India’s rapidly growing and modernizing economy, as normal relations with Delhi could unlock Islamabad’s vast potential for cross-border trade and investment.
India would also benefit from increased trade with Pakistan, besides reducing its cost of monitoring the border with Pakistan, and gaining easier access to Iranian gas. However, these gains would be comparatively less significant because its economy is far larger than Pakistan’s. Peace with Pakistan and consequent removal of the threat of nuclear war from the subcontinent would certainly add to India’s status as a world power, improve the commercial and defense relationships with the United States and possibly help Delhi’s claim to a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council.
Domestically, a successful conclusion of the India-Pakistan peace process - provided it includes a reasonable compromise on Kashmir - would constitute a significant victory for the ruling establishments of both India and Pakistan.
The Kashmir Problem
The Kashmir dispute has been the main point of contention between the two states since they became independent in 1947. The crucial question today is: Can the current peace process lead to a settlement of the Kashmir conflict?
Unquestionably, the focus on building trust and improving India-Pakistan ties marks a major departure from the past, when the Kashmir issue dominated their relationship. Luckily, not only India and Pakistan but also the Kashmiri militants are showing more flexibility as compared with their past rigid stand.
Informally, India laid down some “principles” for conducting negotiations with Pakistan about Kashmir. These included the refusal to consider territorial adjustments or the realignment of regions on communal lines. However, Delhi also insisted that Kashmiris on both sides of the Line of Control should receive more “self-rule” and that the goal should be a settlement with open borders and free movement across them.
On the other hand, for the first time, the Pakistani leadership is no longer insisting on a quick resolution of the Kashmir dispute as a precondition for normal relations with India. Islamabad has also appreciated Delhi’s decision to allow Kashmiri leaders to visit Pakistan and strive for more contact and interaction between the two sides of the Line of Control. This partially fulfills the Pakistani demand to bring the Kashmiris into the peace process.
Not less important is the fact that the separatist leaders in Kashmir have begun to discuss options beyond the scope of existing UN resolutions. This realistic assessment of the situation constitutes a major deviation from their previous position. Not much is known about “other options” at this stage, but the public statement of APHC leader, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, that the UN has “failed Kashmiris” reflects the growing desire of Kashmiris to broaden their search for a solution.
Thus, there seems to be a movement towards tripartite talks involving India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiris. India had vehemently rejected such talks in the past, preferring to discuss the Kashmir issue with the Kashmiris and the Pakistanis separately. After the recent Singh-Musharraf meeting in Delhi, the Pakistani officials were pleased with Singh's assurances that India was committed to resolving the Kashmir tangle, even in the absence of a firm timetable for doing so. Commenting on Manmohan Singh’s commitment, one aide to Musharraf said, “We fully understand his position when he asks for patience on this subject.”
It cannot as yet be assumed that India and Pakistan have completely abandoned their maximum positions on Kashmir. Nevertheless, they seem prepared to accept realities and perhaps even accommodate each other’s concerns. The new flexible and pragmatic approach adopted by Indian and Pakistani leaders promises to explore alternatives that could satisfy both the Pakistani position that the LOC cannot be made a permanent border and the Indian position that the border cannot be redrawn.
In fact, what seems to be considered now is basically a revised form of the “Dixon Plan (1950)” as the possible solution for the Kashmir problem. According to this tentative plan, the Indian and the Pakistani parts of Kashmir would have maximum internal autonomy, while the LOC would be turned into a soft border so that people from either side could easily cross over to the other. Indeed, the proposals put forward by the Kashmir Study Group in its publication, “Way Forward,” draw heavily on the Dixon plan. Many U.S. officials and lawmakers have shown interest in these proposals. Independent sources in the region reveal that the emerging confluence of interests has caused Delhi, Islamabad, and the Kashmiri militant leaders to maintain continual contacts through back-channel diplomacy. United States officials are also working hard behind the scenes to promote the latest peace moves. However, the sensitivities of the issues involved have kept both the Indians and the Pakistanis remarkably quiet about the content of their discussions.
It is true that there are still many difficulties and obstacles to be surmounted. However, the silver lining is that leaders and officials in both countries are encouraging the public to take another look at the new realities in Kashmir, in the region and at the global level. They recognize that much more must be done to unravel this problem.
The dangers ahead
The greatest threat to the India-Pakistan peace process comes from extremists operating on both sides of the Line of Control. Fundamentalist leaders have openly warned that the subcontinent’s peace process is not irreversible. Militant groups in Kashmir, like al-Nasireen, the Save Kashmir Movement, Farzandan-e-Millat and al-Arifeen, have condemned President Musharraf for “kneeling before India” and vow to continue their jihad – the holy war – until Kashmir is free. Similar criticism came from the Pakistani side of the LOC. Salim Hashmi, a spokesman for the Hezb-ul Mujahidin group, warned, “The militant leadership wants the core issue (Kashmir) to be addressed and, if it is not, the so-called peace process cannot bring peace to the region.”
Islamic extremists will undoubtedly try hard to create more violence in order to scuttle the Indian and Pakistani efforts to improve ties and move forward towards a peaceful solution of the Kashmir conflict. When the peace process began gaining momentum in recent months, violence in Kashmir escalated. The terrorist attacks on a religious site in Ayodhaya were clearly targeted to wipe out the emerging goodwill between Delhi and Islamabad, thereby derailing the entire peace process.
It is important to remember that despite engaging in peace negotiations with Pakistan, many Indian officials and strategists still believe that Pakistan is pursuing a “two-faced” policy on Kashmir by continuing to sponsor terrorism while simultaneously engaging in the peace process. Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee’s recent comment that the peace process with Pakistan is still not secure though the negotiations achieved some positive results reflects such concerns. He accused Pakistan of not doing enough to dismantle the “terrorist infrastructure” in Pakistan-held Kashmir and challenged Islamabad to cooperate with India as it has done with the US in the “war on terror.” Indian Prime Minister Singh has also warned that terror attacks in India could disturb the peace process with Pakistan.
Pakistan has refuted all allegations, yet such incidents show how fragile the entire peace process is. One can legitimately ask: can the current goodwill between India and Pakistan be sustained if Kashmiri militants continue their terrorist attacks against Indian interests?
My assessment is that the Indian leadership will continue the peace process unless terrorists succeed in carrying out a high-profile terror attack in India - especially if direct links are discovered between the Kashmiri militants and the Pakistani government. Otherwise, India has many incentives to avoid any large-scale conflict in the region. Yet this leads us to another question: how much time can be spent on talks to solve all outstanding disputes, including the Kashmir issue?
Here again, the main protagonists differ. Having gained the initial advantage by launching the peace process, most of the Indian camp is happy with the current rate of progress and, therefore, is not particularly anxious to accelerate it. But the Pakistani camp does not want to end up in a situation where it cannot show that the peace process led to significant progress on the Kashmir issue - especially after it agreed to greater flexibility on this subject. Such concerns were clearly expressed by President Musharraf during his meeting with India’s Prime Minister: the Kashmir issue must be taken up “immediately” because “we don't have time.” He did not elaborate on it, but he had threatened in the past that the Kashmir dispute must first be resolved if “new Kargils” are to be prevented. In other words, if the Pakistani leadership sees that India is not moving fast enough on Kashmir, it might step up the violence there.
The political and economic situation in Pakistan will also play a major role in this new equation on the sub-continent. The military dictator-turned elected President must strengthen democracy in his country to make sure that any major decision of his government on Kashmir would have wide popular support. If Pervez Musharraf could take advantage of the non-hostile relations with India and improved economic conditions in Pakistan, he would be able to maneuver more freely to find a mutually acceptable solution to the Kashmir dispute and progress to genuinely friendly relations with India.
A lot would depend on the will and determination of the Pakistani leadership to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure on the Pakistani side of Kashmir. If this were to happen, the Indian government would feel compelled to accelerate the peace process and solve the Kashmir imbroglio. There are reports that if the desperate Kashmiri militant groups fail to disrupt the new peace initiative, the Indian government might announce a new package of confidence-building measures to move the peace process forward. Possibly, these might include the release of some “political prisoners” and “prisoners of war” and an official statement about the “disappearance” of hundreds of Kashmiris. Delhi might also consider withdrawing some more troops from Kashmir. Officials in Delhi have indicated that if the political dialogue between the two neighbors goes smoothly, the Indian government might reconsider the autonomy proposals offered by the Jammu and Kashmir government in 2000, which India then rejected.
However, the resolution of the Kashmir conflict is crucial for a lasting peace between India and Pakistan, though it need not be its essential pre-condition. The current peace initiative is enjoying wide public support, yet nationalists and fundamentalists in both countries will pressure their respective governments to maintain a hard-line stance towards each other. This could happen if either government is perceived to compromise on Kashmir – still a highly emotional issue in both countries. Today, both Delhi and Islamabad are walking a tightrope. And given the complexities and seemingly fundamental differences on Kashmir, bringing peace to the region may turn out a long and tardy process.
Nonetheless, Islamabad, Delhi and the Kashmiris appear to have a common interest in peace, and this has created a distinctively different atmosphere and some optimism. The growing demand for peace still needs to be nurtured very carefully. The international community must continue its pressures and incentives to support peace efforts. For if this opportunity is lost, India-Pakistan relations will enter another phase like a very long winter, prompting fears that the two nuclear rivals will be unable to settle their grievances by peaceful means.
