Malaysia and Indonesia are working hard diplomatically to resolve a border dispute in the Sulawesi Sea. Both sides sent warships to the contested area to stake their claims. However, they are economically dependent on each other - Malaysia on Indonesia largely for migrant labor, Indonesia on Malaysia for capital investment - and waging war over two supposedly oil-rich islands is not in their long-term interests.
On the other hand, resentment and mistrust have been quietly building between the two states in recent years. Many observers point to the Malaysian government's recent decision to expel an estimated million-plus illegal Indonesian migrant workers, which led to noisy public protests, flag-burning and calls to "crush Malaysia" in Indonesia. Some Indonesians feel that the attitude of economically stable Malaysia towards its "big brother" Indonesia has been persistently callous and disrespectful. Indonesians have not forgotten 2002, when Malaysian leader Mahathir Mohammad sent back 400,000 Indonesian workers (many to the country's poorest and most volatile regions), threatening to jail those who stayed behind. Hundreds died during the journey.
More recently, the Malaysian government refused to accept refugees from the war-torn Indonesian province of Aceh. Meanwhile, in Malaysia there is a widely held belief that Indonesian migrant workers pose a criminal threat, which the state-controlled media have routinely played up to divert attention from government abuse and mismanagement.
In Malaysia, the public tends to acquiesce in the government's draconian legislation in the name of "national interest"; giving the government more leeway in dealing with the border dispute. Indonesians, on the other hand, have a long tradition of standing up for causes. They fought for their independence from the Dutch (whereas the British handed Malaysians theirs). And a public outcry helped to end despot Suharto's 32-year rule in 1998, pressured Abdurrahman Wahid to resign in 2001, and caused the Indonesian government to think twice about prosecuting convicted Islamic terrorist Abu Bakar Ba'asyir for fear of retaliation.
This raises the question: To what extent are nationalists willing to go? Would they employ terrorism in the border dispute? Morten Hansen, a military and security analyst with the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies (IDSS) in Singapore, considers the possibility "highly unlikely, because this crisis is simply territorial and very traditional in essence". However, there has been no confidence-building between Indonesia and Malaysia, despite attempts by leaders to play down the border dispute. Indonesia plans to build 25 lighthouses on remote islands bordering Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines in an effort to assert its control over them, while the Malaysian navy recently confirmed that it had parachuted elite troops from an aircraft in the Sulawesi Sea.
In Indonesia suspicion is particularly strong. Key elements in the army, some politicians in Jakarta, and a substantial part of the Indonesian public really believe that separatists within and foreign parties endanger Indonesia’s territorial integrity.
Malaysian and Indonesian leaders began negotiations on Tuesday in Jakarta to settle the dispute, but few predict quick results. Finding a diplomatic solution would be in keeping with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) way. But in this instance, public pressure on both sides not to make any concessions might make things tricky. ASEAN diplomacy has usually managed rather than resolved disputes. Yet management is not easy when oil is involved, particularly at a time when global competition for oil is fierce and Indonesians protest almost daily over a government-imposed fuel price hike.
In the past, relations between Malaysia and Indonesia were aided by the rapport between strongmen Suharto and Mahathir. While newly elected Indonesian President Susilo Bamabang Yudhoyono and Malaysian Premier Abdullah Badawi don't have the iron-fisted reputations of their predecessors, their relationship has not crystallized and their assumed positive attributes have not always worked in their favor. The soft-spoken Abdullah was tagged "gentle but tough" when he took over from Mahathir in late 2003, and it was widely thought that this would help Malaysia patch up relations with neighboring
countries. But relations with at least two of Malaysia's neighbors, Thailand and Indonesia, have arguably gotten worse under Abdullah's leadership. In recent months, Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has vociferously charged the Abdullah administration with negligence in pursuing Islamic terrorist elements in northern Malaysia that he accused of fueling unrest in Thailand's restive south. Now comes the border row with Indonesia. Could it be that Abdullah's soft style is indirectly encouraging Malaysia's neighbors to test his mettle and see what they can get away with?
Abdullah does seem to possess a spirit of compromise, which cannot hurt at the bargaining table. Nor will Yudhoyono's calls for "self-restraint". But neither gesture will necessarily help, unless both sides address their entrenched wariness of each other.
Note : Ioannis Gatsiounis, a native of New York, has worked as a freelance foreign correspondent and has been living in Malaysia since late 2002.
