Half-hearted solutions have been the motto of successive
governments in Lebanon since the country tapped the international markets
to finance the reconstruction of its infrastructure. Former Prime Minister
Rafik Hariri, who wanted to breathe life into the Lebanese economy after
years of pain, hoped to rebuild Lebanon from the money pledged by donor
states in 1992. But these pledges did not materialize.
After failing to secure $5 billion in aid packages from the United States,
Europe and Arab states, Hariri was compelled to borrow from local banks
and international financial agencies at a very high cost. The interest
rates on government treasury bills at the time he took office exceeded
40%. This level was gradually reduced by pressure from the Finance Ministry
and the Central Bank. Many economists questioned the wisdom of borrowing
at such high rates and wondered why the government had not negotiated
lower ones with the banks.
According to Hariri, the reconstruction drive of 1994-1998 accounted for
only $5.5 billion out of a public debt of $18 billion in 1998. The remainder
was due to accumulated interest and high spending on the military and
the salaries of public officials. Now the country has a $35 billion public
debt, representing more than 190% of its gross domestic product, one of
the highest ratios in the world.
Since 1994, Lebanon has issued over $21 billion worth of eurobonds, compared
to $1.5 billion in Egypt and $250 million in Bahrain. It has more bonds
in the international bond markets than any other Arab state. Conducted
transparently through regular market channels, the issue of Lebanese eurobonds
is managed by the Finance Ministry in partnership with international and
local investment banks and has attracted a large base of subscribers.
Thus eurobonds issued by the government represent more than 50% of Lebanon's
$35 billion public debt. The current government of Omar Karameh, who blasted
the monetary policies of Hariri's government, was forced recently to tap
the local and international markets again to check the rise of the public
debt.
In November 2004, the Finance Ministry announced that the government had
successfully raised $1.375 billion in dollar-denominated eurobonds in
an effort to finance the public debt. "The transaction was co-managed
for the first time by Lebanon's BLOM bank, in addition to two international
investment banks, Deutsche Bank and Credit Suisse First Boston," Finance
Minister Elias Saba said at the time.
The issue was divided into three tranches: $625 million of floating rate
notes at six months U.S. Libor (London Inter-bank Offered Rates) plus
325 basis points expiring on November 30th 2009; $425 million of fixed-rate
notes at a coupon of 7% due December 14th 2009; and finally a $325 million
additional issue of 7.75% notes due in September 2012. This borrowing
habit will continue in 2005 because the government does not seem to have
the political will or vision to come up with an innovative solution to
the "debt trap crisis."
Hariri warned a few months ago that the public debt may reach $45 billion
during the next three years if the "political situation in the country
remained the same," a clear reference to the extended term of President
Emile Lahoud, which divided the country into two large camps for the first
time in many years.
Hariri's supporters fear Lahoud may further damage Lebanon's credit ratings
in 2005 if he insists in delaying badly needed reforms such as privatization.
Theyadd that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has commended the achievements
of former Finance Minister Fouad Siniora, who managed to reduce the budget
deficit in 2003 and the first eight months of 2004 by increasing the revenues
of the state and reducing expenses.
The IMF projected a GDP growth of 5 percent in 2005 but expressed alarm
at the government's inability to implement reforms to reduce the public
debt. The Word Bank Vice President Francois Bourguignon, who visited Beirut
in December 2004, warned that the public debt in Lebanon is no longer
sustainable, urging the government to take immediate measures to reduce
it.
Is it too late to implement reforms and cut spending in this tense political
climate, or will the new government - to be formed after the parliamentary
elections in five months' time - have enough courage to proceed with fiscal
adjustment? And is privatization feasible these days or must we look for
more logical solutions to reassure the local market?
Piecemeal solutions are no longer acceptable. Banks cannot finance the
treasury with money through eurobonds or treasury bills forever. There
are probably hundreds of ideas to get out of the crisis, but if the will
is absent then we shall have to watch helplessly as our public debt hits
record levels and the economy shrinks further.