Islamists have been active in Kirghyzstan since the early 1990ies. They have most influence in the Osh and Djelal-Abad provinces in the South. Kirghyzstan is not rich, but these provinces are especially poor. In Osh province, the living standard of 60% of the population of is below the poverty line. Islamists have also penetrated into other regions, including into the city of Bishkek, where an Islamic center has operated since 1990 under Sadykjan Kamaluddin, who for a short period occupied the post of Mufti of Kirghyzstan. He advocated Islamic activism in politics. In 1992, several Islamic circles were acting in the country. Their members demanded "a return to true Islam". However, at first Kirghyz Islamists behaved in a restrained manner and did not worry the authorities too much.
The situation changed at the end of 1995, when emissaries of the Uzbek branch of the Islam Liberation Party (Hizb At-Tahrir Al-Islami or HTI), a faction with the strategic aim of creating an Islamic caliphate in Central Asia, began to penetrate into the Osh province. The creation of a caliphate implies the replacement of all the Central Asian governments by Islamic rule. Its core would be the Fergana Valley, now divided between Kirghyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.
Since the bulk of the HTI is in Uzbekistan - the main target of the radical Islamists, President Islam Karimov has taken strong measures to defeat it. However, the HTI has survived. Some of its members emigrated, or, putting it plainly, just crossed the border between Uzbekistan and Kirghyzstan, which in the mid-90s was not demarcated. The Zholboros Zhorobekov, Chairman of Kirghyzstan's State Commission for Religious Affairs (a governmental body), is sure that the shift of HTI activity to Kirghyzstan resulted directly from the "repressive measures on part of Uzbekistan".
In 1996, the first HTI cells were formed on Kirghyz territory. Initially, their members were almost exclusively Uzbeks, but in 1999 the Kirghyz also started joining the HTI, succumbing more and more willingly to slogans of radical Islam. Most HTI activists are 20 to 35 years old. They represent very diverse sections of society. In their own words, they "read books about Islam and tell people about what they have read". When the Kirghyz national security bodies arrested several dozens HTI members during the autumn of 1999 in Osh, Djelal-Abad, Karasui, Uzgen and other districts, they were astounded by the abundance of propaganda literature. The HTI agitators receive material rewards for distributing it. Among the books confiscated from the Islamists were Notion on the Caliphate, Islamic Order, What is Hizb ut-Tahrir etc. Many HTI-published Consciousness (Al-Va'ii) magazines were also found. According to security agents, this printed matter contains instructions on how to recruit new members for the party and to conduct propaganda. The material was in three languages - Arab, Uzbek and Kirghyz. The translation into the Kirghyz language was a very professional one.
The HTI ascribes importance to its image in the secular press. In the spring of 2000 its representatives got in touch with some journalists from the southern provinces, offering cooperation by providing information on developments in the Fergana Valley and on what influence the party has there. The HTI pays special attention to attracting young people, including students and school pupils, to its activities. In some districts (e.g. in the Nookat district of Osh province) party cells and educational circles were set up. Along with the study of the Koran and the Arab language, there are discussions about politics and ways of creating an Islamic state.
Like other Islamic radicals acting in Kirghyzstan, HTI rejects armed struggle. It does not call for overthrowing authorities by force, stressing in every possible way that it is not implicated in combat actions. The Kirghyz HTI concentrates on propaganda as well as on gradually penetrating into central and local government structures, which its ideologists want to fill gradually with Islamists. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the HTI, like other Islamists, sympathizes with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which is actually at war with the ruling regime. In the autumn 1999 and 2000, the IMU was engaged in active offensive operations, its armed forces not distant from the city of Tashkent.
Already twice, intense combat operations have been waged on the territory of Kirghyzstan involving military units fighting the rebels. After the cessation of hostilities a large amount of the HTI propaganda literature was found in the captured camps of the rebels. Of course, this fact cannot serve as absolute proof of military cooperation between HTI and IMU. However, there is no doubt about the frequent identity of their ideological purposes.
Far graver are the reports of the intensifying political coordination between HTI, IMU and the Afghan Taleban, which was discussed at a conference held in September 2000. Over 300 citizens of Kirghyzstan, among them quite a few ethnic Kirghyz, are reportedly getting military training in the training camps of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Political and military support provided to the Islamists of Kirghyzstan by their foreign allies is coupled with financial aid. Amounts ranging from hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars have been mentioned. Such financial aid is of no small significance. The funds are partly derived from the trade and traffic in drugs. According to the data provided by the Security Council of the Republic of Kirghyzstan about 1900 kg of drugs were confiscated in Kirghyz territory in 1999. This quantity is estimated at about 1.5%-2% of the drugs in transit. Drug trade turnover totals something between $500 million and $1 billion.
The Kirghyz elite is worried by all this, but has seemingly not formulated its definitive position towards the Islamists yet. On one hand, a "ruthless fight" was declared on Islamists and their mass detentions in autumn 1999 and 2000, as well as the IMU members' extradition to Uzbekistan seem to prove it. Yet, on the other hand, unlike Uzbek President Islam Karimov, Askar Akaev has a more flexible policy towards radical Islamists. Despite the authoritarian tendency he showed over the past two years, Akaev has less power than his Uzbek colleague. Consequently he is compelled to maneuver, taking into account the interests of most diverse political forces, including the Islamists, which one fine day may become the social basis for opposition to his policies. Secondly, the armed forces of Kirghyzstan may not now be strong enough to oppose Islamic combatants if the conflict is aggravated. Thirdly, it may be presumed that Akaev cherishes a hope or illusion that it is possible to reach a political agreement with the Islamists in the long run. This is indicated by his "highly respectful attitude" towards Sadykjan Kamaluddin. It should not be forgotten that Kamaluddin may have proposed Akaev's candidature for the presidency.
Akaev is trying hard to maintain a dialogue with the followers of radical Islam. This annoys Islam Karimov. However, Karimov himself is ready for contacts with Islamists, not in Uzbekistan but with the Afghan Taleban. He may wish to play a mediation role in the conflict between the Taleban and the North Alliance confronting it. Perhaps by maintaining normal relations with the Taleban Karimov hopes to "settle things" with his internal Islamic opposition, which the Taleban supports. However, the Uzbek President insists that Akaev should fight against the Islamists with greater determination. His logic is that he does not want to create a precedent of a dialogue with Islamic radicals (though such a precedent already exists in Tajikistan); he fears that the bases of Uzbek Islamists may be organized on Kirghyz territory; and he is worried, not without reason, about the prospect of Islamic radicals participating in Kirghyzstan's administrative bodies.
Meanwhile, in September 2000 Kamaluddin - highly valued by the Kirghyz President - proposed to Karimov to hold talks with the HTI and IMU. Moreover, this proposition was made at the international forum "Islam and Contemporaneity" in the presence of Akaev. Of course, this challenge did not change Karimov's position and made him ponder even more thoroughly over the influence of the Islamic factor on the situation in Kirghyzstan. In Kirghyzstan this issue is also on the agenda. The National Security Council admits that a new wave of Islamic military activities may be expected soon. How will the growing HTI behave if this happens? Will Askar Akaev be able to choose the right approach to Islamic radicalism?
