Palestinian and Jordanian officials have carefully avoided expressing their mistrust, partly to prevent blowing up a brewing crisis, but also since their leaders are under tremendous US pressure to comply with Israeli demands. The besieged Palestinian leadership feels that it cannot publicly question Jordan's role, as it does not want to make the Jordanian Government, already dependent on US financial and political aid, more vulnerable to Israeli and American pressure. Yet Jordanian officials have been reluctant to disclose the real extent of their projected role in the West Bank.
A full-blown crisis could compel Jordan to tighten restrictions on Palestinian movements across the Hussein Bridge, a crucial outlet for Palestine's people and goods to the rest of the world. A Palestinian official based in Ramallah said: "Arafat is extremely frustrated. Jordanians are not saying much while we are getting unconfirmed reports from Europeans, Israelis and unofficial Jordanian sources of scenarios including a direct Jordanian security involvement in the West Bank." Jordanian officials have repeatedly insisted that Amman's role would be confined to training Palestinian security forces, as it has been doing since 1994. The officials have also indicated that they would consider other options if requested by the Palestinians. But such statements, which enable Jordan not to appear defiant in the face of America's wishes, are highly misleading when the besieged Palestinian leadership and Tel Aviv's desire that it submit to Israel's demands are taken into consideration.
Thus it was no surprise that - despite intra-Palestinian divisions and dissatisfaction with Arafat himself - all PLO and non-PLO groups, ranging from Fatah and leftist parties to Hamas and breakaway PLO factions, were openly critical of the security roles played by both Jordan and Egypt. In a strongly worded statement, ten Palestinian groups urged Egypt and Jordan not to make any moves that would help Sharon, claiming that the security role projected for them suggested "the Palestinian people are the problem rather than the unfair occupation of our land."
Many Palestinians, as well as some Jordanian analysts, believe that Amman and Cairo should be careful not to be used by Israel to redefine the conflict in terms indicating that the Palestinian "threat "or "terror" (words used by Israel and America to describe Palestinian resistance) should be contained. The potential effect of the 10-group statement, combined with Yasser Arafat's influence and the dissatisfaction of Palestinians living in Jordan (who account for half the population of the Kingdom) has alarmed Amman.
The attitude of Palestinians in Jordan is not merely influenced by the PLO opposition to Jordan's security role and has spread beyond the country's 11 refugee camps, a factor affecting the security of the country. Unlike a decade ago, when Jordanian nationalists feared a Palestinian takeover of the Kingdom - a fear that persists today - many Jordanians strongly object to Jordan acting on behalf of Israel to end the Palestinian intifada. Many are convinced that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has no intention of ending the occupation. And with the construction of the apartheid wall, the annexation of the large settlements of the West Bank and the de facto siege of Gaza, Israel will, in effect, manage to "strangle" the Palestinian people, prompting a slow exodus to Jordan and preempting the repatriation of Palestinian refugees.
"We shall not be party to denying the Palestinian refugees their legitimate right to return to their homes in Ramallah, Jaffa, Nablus or Hebron," wrote Tareq Masarweh in the leading Al-Rai newspaper. Massarweh's view reflects a commonly held belief that the US and Israel want to use both Egypt and Jordan as tools to undermine Palestinian national rights, ensure their compliance by force and cause civil strife in Palestine and Jordan.
"This security role does not serve the Palestinian people; it is an attempt to guarantee the success of the Sharon plan by undermining Palestinian unity and exonerating the occupation army by placing the responsibility of confronting the Palestinian people on Arab armies." wrote Fahed Al-Fanek, again in the mostly government-owned Al-Rai... Fanek, who in the 80s and 90s was known for his blatant rejection of a Jordanian role that would lead to Palestinian domination of the kingdom, is again projecting broad fears of a Jordanian-Palestinian confrontation that would serve Israel and could easily spill over into Jordan.
The shift of emphasis by nationalist Jordanian commentators is partly due to the collapse of the Oslo peace process, outrage at Sharon's plan and anger at the Jordanian Government's support for the American invasion and occupation of Iraq. It also stems from a fundamental change in Israel-American strategy, which now completely excludes Arab parties, including the Palestinians, from negotiations about the Palestinians' future status. Seen in this light, US-backed Israeli stipulations for Egypt and Jordan to assume security roles in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank do not aim to create alternative Arab political representation for the Palestinian people.
This particular issue was already resolved when the US publicized President Bush's declaration, effectively giving Washington and Tel Aviv the right to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict through bilateral agreements. Fully endorsing Sharon's plans of unilateral redeployment from the Gaza Strip, the annexation of the largest blocs of West Bank settlements into Israel and denial of the Palestinian refugees' right of return, Washington is also giving Arabs the task of ensuring Palestinian compliance by enforcing security in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
To some, this formula echoes British colonial policy of the late 19th century that created the social and political landscape of Palestine and Jordan. The US wants Jordan to assume the role of the former British colonial institutions - block Palestinian independence, enable Israeli plans and weaken Arab resistance. Washington is using blatant blackmail [by exploiting Jordan's fear of instability spilling over from Iraq and Palestine] to force Jordan to comply with its demands," says Mowafak Mahadeen, Al-Arab Al-Youm columnist and student of Jordanian history.
The irony is that by heeding Washington Jordan may increase the danger to its stability. For the time being, however, Jordan seems to be keeping its options open. King Abdullah's declared priority since succeeding his late father in 1998 is not to reclaim Jordan's representation of the West Bank but to do "whatever it takes" to ensure the survival of the Hashemite Kingdom east of the River Jordan. This objective was promoted under the vague "Jordan First" slogan - an all- encompassing phrase used to justify Amman's pro-American policies and silence dissent.
