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Al-Ahram Weekly, Egypt, 3-9 June 2004
Summary of article by Omayma Abdel-Latif

Three members of the Interim Governing Council (IGC) arrived at Al-Sahn Al-Haydari - Imam Ali's holy shrine - to organize a sit-in strike protesting the damage caused to one of the gates of one of the holiest shrines in Shiite Islam by fierce fighting between the young Shiite leader Moqtada Al-Sadr's Al-Mahdi militia and US-led forces. IGC members Ahmed Chalabi, Salaama Al- Khafaji and Abdel-Karim Al-Muhamadawi came to Najaf to negotiate a cease-fire after weeks of fighting in the holy cities in their capacity as members of Al-Beit Al-Shii (the Shiite House) - a term coined to describe the umbrella organization of 20 Iraqi Shiite political groups, both within and outside the IGC. The formation of this religion-based political organization evoked questions concerning the likelihood that it might strengthen the existing tendency among Iraqis to organize themselves along confessional or ethnic lines.

After the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, Iraqi Shiites tried to play a decisive role in shaping the unfolding political process in Iraq. Though they were finally able to express themselves freely, and for the first time claim a share of power matching their demographic weight (13 of the 25 IGC members are Shiites) they were not given representation as a single, unified group.

Al-Beit Al-Shii is "an attempt to create a collective leadership among the various Shiite groups", said Adnan Al-Asaady, deputy head of Al-Dawa Party, one of groups party to the organization. "The diversity of views among Iraqi Shiites concerning the occupation, Iraq's political future, and especially the role of religion in politics have forced us to seek a centralized leadership," Al-Asaady, who is also Deputy Interior Minister, told Al-Ahram Weekly in a telephone interview from Baghdad. He does not believe that a religion-based organization would exacerbate sectarian divisions and dismissed the idea that it is directed against any political or religious force in Iraq, insisting that it does not encourage sectarian activities. "It is in our interest that Iraq does not turn into sectarian cantons," he said, adding that Al-Dawa has in the past allied itself with Sunni political movements, like the Iraqi Islamic Party.

The idea to create Al-Beit Al-Shii emerged when the IGC's Shiite members began to coordinate their political views on key issues. The mastermind behind the creation of this body uniting Iraq's Shiites is believed to be Ahmed Chalabi, head of the Iraqi National Congress (INC). Al- Asaady would not elaborate on how much influence Chalabi is exercising over the group, but acknowledged that, "he played a key role in putting life into it."

Chalabi led the delegation to Najaf and championed the mediation efforts between Al-Sadr and commanders of the US-led forces. Success in this negotiation was crucial to the organization's credibility, since it was its first collective effort. It came under heavy pressure to intervene after Iraq's Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani issued a strong warning threatening to "stand up to the American forces if they conduct an all out attack on Najaf" - an action the Americans were seriously contemplating in order to crush Al-Sadr's militia.

However, a ceasefire agreement was reached. Muwafaq Al-Rubei, Iraq's national security advisor and founding member of Al-Beit Al-Shii, told reporters that the truce was the result of intensive talks held with Al-Sadr. In a letter addressed to "my brothers who are members of Al- Beit Al-Shii," Al-Sadr said that he wanted to put an end to the tragic situation in Najaf, and therefore would accept most of the conditions. Nevertheless, he objected to a joint US-Iraqi police force patrolling the streets of Najaf, demanding Iraqis only. Al-Rubei also intimated that a deal could be struck whereby members of Al-Mahdi militia would join state security bodies. It was considered a victory for Al-Sadr, that the Americans were willing to give up their demand to arrest the young Shia leader, and that both the US-led coalition and the Al- Mahdi militia agreed to withdraw their forces from the holy cities.

Yet while Al-Sadr kept a low profile and made no public appearances (he was absent from the Friday prayers last week) the fragile cease-fire was violated several times, each party blaming the other. Intermittent fighting claimed the lives of more than 30 fighters of the Al-Mahdi militia and at least four American soldiers. But Chalabi remained confident that the ceasefire still held and during the mediation efforts continuing throughout the week told a press conference "We will remain in Najaf until the job is done."

An issue crucial to Al-Beit Al-Shii survival is how it deals with tensions within the Shia community. Intensified intra-Shia rivalries might render reconciliation efforts futile. This became apparent when Al-Sadr and members of the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) engaged in a war of words over the failed attempt on the life of Sadr Al-Din Al-Qubanji, the sheikh of the Imam Ali Mosque and a leading SCIRI member. Shortly after the attack on Friday, the Al-Mahdi militia claimed that it had arrested the man accused of trying to assassinate Al-Qubanji, but would not hand him over to the SCIRI.

SCIRI sources told the London Al-Hayat newspaper that two factions within it differ about how to deal with the Al-Mahdi militia. One of them believes that the militia includes former Baathists and therefore should be eliminated. "It is largely a struggle between the exiled Iraqis who want to have a monopoly over the political process in Iraq, and those who stayed in Iraq and suffered under Saddam's wrath," Abbas Al-Rubei, editor-in-chief of Al-Hawza Al-Natiqah, the mouthpiece of Al-Sadr's movement, told Al-Hayat.

This internal struggle and the policies of the new Iraqi government will probably define the agenda of Al-Beit Al-Shii. Its task, however, is difficult because in the past Iraqi Shiites have not organized themselves politically along confessional lines, or even supported a single leadership. It is still too early to conclude that Al-Beit Al-Shii can legitimately claim to represent the aspirations of Iraq's Shiites

The Peninsula, Qatar, 8 June 2004
Summary of report from Baghdad

Nine of Iraq's militias, constituting more than 100,000 armed men, agreed to disband yesterday within the framework of a retraining program, but the deal does not cover rebel cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr's fighters. Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi announced that most of the militia fighters would be integrated into Iraq's new security forces while others are retrained for jobs in civilian life or go into retirement with a pension. 'I am happy to announce today the successful completion of negotiations on the nationwide reintegration of militias and other armed forces previously not under state control,' the Prime Minister said.

The militias concerned include the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP); the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK); the Sunni-based Iraqi Islamic Party; the Shiite fundamentalist Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI) and its Badr Brigade militia; the Prime Minister's own Iraqi National Accord; Ahmed Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress; the Shiite Iraqi Hezbollah; the Iraqi Communist Party, and the Shiite fundamentalist Dawa Party.

Allawi said about 40 per cent of the decommissioned forces would become ordinary civilians and another 60 per cent would join 'the Iraqi armed forces, the Iraqi police service, or the internal security services of the Kurdish regional government'. According to plans presented by the US-run coalition in Iraq, some 60,000 former militiamen will have entered the program by July 1, with the vast majority joining Iraqi security forces, about 10,000 going into retirement and others getting new job training or joining private security firms.

A senior coalition official said $200m, to be administered by Iraq's Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, had been set aside for paying pensions to veterans or to provide jobs, training and education to former fighters. Coalition officials estimated that 90,000 militiamen would be brought into the reintegration program by the time Iraq holds its first democratic elections in January 2005.

But the agreement makes no provision for Sadr's militia, estimated to be up to 10,000 men strong. By not becoming party to the agreement, this militia is now formally recognized as an illegal body, and officials said that its members would be banned from holding political office for three years after leaving the organization. Meanwhile, an arms depot belonging to Sadr's militia exploded near a mosque in the Shiite town of Kufa, killing three people and wounding 12. The mosque, where Sadr has preached in the past, was slightly damaged.

The United States and Britain pressed UN Security Council members to pass a resolution quickly on Iraq's future. New proposals emerged, including a controversial one from France on Iraq's right to say 'no' to a major U.S. military operation. Chile, Brazil and Spain seek to strengthen international humanitarian law and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan wants some language changes on the UN role. Control of the 160,000 US-led troops is the most contentious issue in the draft, which gives international endorsement to the interim Iraqi government that is to assume power on June 30.

The Shi'ite cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani warned that any UN resolution on Iraq that mentions an interim constitution endorsing autonomy for Kurds would have 'dangerous consequences'.

Note: The Shiites can accomplish nothing by opposing Kurdish autonomy in the north of Iraq, besides weakening their case for ruling the south and center of the country. A Shiite attempt to rule the Kurds will be met by violence and any US regime encouraging it would be guilty of a gross misjudgment.

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