His remarks were in reaction to the Government's plan to revive the Iskandar Muda Military Command (abolished in the early 1980s), on the grounds that the existence of a separate military command would reduce the central Government's interference in security affairs in Aceh. President Megawati Soekarnoputri, who has the final say and has reportedly given a "positive response" to the plan, is expected to announce her decision in the near future.
The government's plan to reestablish a separate military command in Aceh also met resistance from a human rights group, the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence and from the Aceh-Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF). These said in separate statements that the plan would worsen human rights abuses rather than restore security and order.
"The plan must be rejected because it would only repeat the mistakes made by the Soeharto regime in the past when dealing with Aceh," said Hendardi, head of the Indonesian Legal Aid and Human Rights Association (PBHI). "The Megawati administration is doomed to fail because reviving the military command means repeating Soeharto's mistakes." The PBHI claims that history proved that military institutions in the regions are established to support the military's desire to maintain its dominant political role. "This plan will reopen the doors for the military to return to the political arena and stall the democratization process," Hendardi said.
The plan to revive the Aceh military command raises doubts about the Army's promise to reduce its political and territorial roles. It comes at a time when the military has removed some powerful posts, such as Head of Sociopolitical and Territorial Affairs, from its organizational structure. Hendardi pointed out that East Timor's secession from Indonesia and the escalating violence in Irian Jaya and Aceh were all evidence that the security approach did not pay. "The impunity enjoyed by the military and police in Aceh has destroyed the Acehnese people's trust in the Government," he said.