The United States has some legitimate interests in the Central Asian region but an intelligent strategy to safeguard those interests in nowhere in sight. The SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) announced at its last summit that it does not want US military bases in the region, Uzbekistan asked the US military to vacate the Khanabad base within six months, Kyrgyzstan indicated that it would be happy to see the back of the last GI on its soil soonest and Afghan President Hamid Karzai, not wanting to be left behind, said last week that US forces might not have anything more to do in Afghanistan.

The following are legitimate American interests in the Central Asian region:

• The need to protect the sources and routes of hydrocarbon resources in the Caspian and Central Asian region.

• The fear of the rise of extremist Islam in Central Asia. 

• The urge, rightly or wrongly, to freeze – and preferably roll back – the spread of Russian, Chinese and Iranian influence in the region. 

• Concerns about drug trafficking, cross-border movement of terrorists and weapons.

The objectives are understandable. What is not understandable is how the United States tries to achieve these objectives.

If the merit of an approach depends on the results it yields, there is hardly anything worth praising so far in the US policy in Central Asia. In the wake of 9-11, the Pentagon wanted bases in the region and got them. Back then, it seemed a great achievement to be only the second western power after Alexander the Great to maintain a military presence in the region – but now we have the benefit of hindsight.

Here are some of the results of ‘boots on the ground’:

• The Ferghana valley is bubbling with unrest. Some of the lava boiled over from Osh to Bishkek and some of it may flow from Andijan to Bukhara, Samarkand and Tashkent. Juma Namangani was killed and Tahir Yuldash is probably in an Uzbek prison but the public anger is more structured than ever.

• Yuldashev, an obscure teacher, has emerged as a motivating force for many in the region. Akramia has become a model, not only of the viability of Islamic economics but also a way of resisting the oppressive regimes. 

• Hizb-ut-Tehrir, a peaceful movement for the last half-century, seems to have lost control over its Central Asian chapters.  

• For the first time, China and Russia seem to be making genuine headway in mutual cooperation on a grand scale. The SCO is a formidable structure of monumental proportions. If India, Iran and Pakistan also join as full members, this would be the largest military alliance in the world. What has brought them together can be described in an eastern saying: Not love for Ali but enmity for Muawiya brought them together. 

• This year has seen the record poppy crop in Afghanistan. Compared to 83 tons in the last year of the Taleban regime, this year’s crop has topped 450 tons. Just as an aside, the poppy comes mostly from Helmand, Zabul, Farah and Kandahar provinces – the areas that have been under US control for several years.

If the “boots on the ground” have failed to achieve any US foreign policy objectives, this must be a time to revise the strategy. As they say, there is no lesson in the second kick of the mule. Here are some useful suggestions for the US planners:

1) The US military bases in the region should be dismantled as quickly as possible and there should be no more probing for new bases. From the American point of view this would have a desirable effect on the SCO. In the absence of a compelling factor, the SCO countries, especially China and Russia, would lose immediate interest in consolidating SCO.

2) Absence of US military in the region would also deflate any Islamic movements that may be leaning toward extremism.

3) Regime change should be dropped as a desirable goal. Also, there should be no flirting with imaginary opposition leaders because past experience has proved that contacts with so-called opposition ‘leaders in exile’ bring no tangible results except to expand Russian influence in the region.

4) Open competition is the only viable way to get the hydrocarbon resources of the region. Because of the disparity in end-user prices in American, Chinese and Russian markets, the United States is in an excellent position to buy as much oil and gas from the region as it wants.

5) An oil and gas pip eline is its own security guarantee. One of the lessons that have trickled down from history is that military force can be effective in the short term but economic considerations are always the best incentive in the long run.

6) Poppy farmers in Afghanistan don’t earn more than US $300 per hectare from their lands. Anything that brings them a little more than that would help cut down the prime source of raw material for heroin.

7) More American companies should be encouraged to invest in the region. However, the big ones, especially the multinationals, should be asked to respect the culture and traditions of the region and cease to dictate their own rules. For major investors, the regional governments are always ready to put together special incentive packages. The economic prosperity of Central Asia’s people is the only thing that would ultimately allow the US to attain its foreign policy objectives there.

8) Whatever military objectives still remain in the region can easily be addressed in the NATO format.