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News Central Asia, Turkmenistan, 14 December 2003
Summary of report from Ashgabat

With the passing away last Friday of Haider Aliyev, the charismatic and controversial former president of Azerbeijan, and the capture of the deposed Iraqi president Saddam Hussein from a hole near Tikrit, the entire greater Central Asian region has suddenly crossed the threshold into the second phase of the New Great Game.

Aliyev was a great man, one of the definitions of greatness being the ability to influence events beyond the immediate zone of one's authority. His rule in Azerbeijan will go down in history as an era of very real transition - changing ideology. His impact on the Greater Central Asian region will begin to manifest itself very soon.

Saddam is an ugly monster. His capture will trigger developments, positive and negative, that will soon engulf all of Central Asia. We consider the culturally interwoven stretch of land that encompasses Azerbeijan, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghyzstan and Tajikistan as the Greater Central Asian region, and this entire region will be affected by Aliyev and Saddam.

Both, Haider Aliyev and Saddam Hussein, have left powerful legacies by their various acts of commission and omission. Aliyev, almost single-handedly, chiseled away a firm niche for American interests in the region. Although his shift toward the United States was initially shaped by the Russian invasion of Baku in January 1990, Russia's attitude towards the Nagorno-Karabakh problem and its obsession to block any energy corridors bypassing Russia, he soon discovered that he needed a robust umbrella to protect his country from the combined power of Russia and Iran. The only umbrella in sight was the United States and it always comes with a price. On 3 December 2003, Don Rumsfeld paid a surprise visit to Baku and outlined the first installment of the price Azerbeijan must pay to remain under the US wing: basing rights for the US forces that would soon be shifting away from Germany under the Pentagon plans for a leaner and meaner force, and general consent to act as American policeman in the Caspian. This is the first part of the legacy of Haider Aliyev.

The second part of Aliyev's legacy manifested itself in the fact that questionable elections in Georgia resulted in the undignified removal of Shevarnadze, but the same kind of elections brought American blessing and endorsement for Ilham Aliyev, the only son of Haider Aliyev. With the death of Haider Aliyev, the power players have begun transmitting probing signals in all directions. The moment of truth has arrived for Azerbeijan.

Azerbeijan has entered a large number of pleas for settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh question, appealing to anyone and everyone. The idea is to see how each player would react. Much of the future goodwill of Azeri government would depend on how Washington responds to these pleas. So far, there has been only a single, non-committal, sentence from Rumsfeld, "We respect the territorial integrity of Azerbeijan."

On the other hand, the Americans stepped up their efforts to bring a full-fledged army base into Azerbeijan and prod Azerbeijan to start playing the kind of role in the Caspian that was once played by the late Shah of Iran in the Persian Gulf. Whether Azerbeijan is really capable of playing this role is an open question. With the very visible Russian might in the Caspian, Kazakhstan's declared intention to build a formidable navy of its own and Iran's efforts to bring some kind of balance to military power in the Caspian, the possibilities are endless, none very conducive to peace in the region.

A general signal, received loud and clear by all the rulers in the CIS is that as long as you kow-tow to the Americans, there would be no questions asked about your controversial election results, or human rights, or internal repression, but the moment you step out of line, you may find yourself flat on your ass, both feet awry, your eyes smarting with street dust.

Saddam, with his capture, bequeathed another legacy to Central Asia, a legacy so far reaching that it is still premature to give any opinion on it. Saddam and Aliyev had some traits in common. Both ruled for more than a couple of decades, Saddam for 24 years and Aliyev for almost 33 years, albeit with a small break. Both wanted to start dynastic regimes, one succeeded, the other failed. Both ruled with an iron hand, impatient with the opposition and both considered the promotion of a personality cult a legitimate way of strengthening their power.

Both were sitting atop vast reserves of oil and gas and were fully aware of the importance of their geographical location. Both were "blue eyed boys" of Uncle Sam: one fell out of favor at some stage; the other breathed his last in the lap of his dear uncle. Both were well versed in the ways of chameleon, able to change their spots to suit the circumstances; but Saddam didn't act fast enough, while Aliyev managed to keep pace with the times. However, Saddam's capture will create ripples across the region that may bring unforeseen results.

Let us look at some of the possibilities: The US high command claims that Saddam loyalists are putting up resistance against American occupation that has resulted in the death of at least 196 American soldiers since Bush declared an end to major combat in Iraq. If the resistance really dies down after Saddam's arrest, the US will have the breathing space to pursue their next steps in their overall plan of occupying the Middle East and Central Asia. There are already some indications: President Bush has authorized sanctions against Syria. The language of the presidential order indicates that the imposition of sanctions is a mere formality before the next logical step - a full-fledged invasion of the country.

Meanwhile, the American Enterprise Institute has started - in collaboration with Sada-e-Iran, an Iranian opposition radio station - to beam radio transmissions at Iran, an unprecedented step in its own right. The idea, clearly, is to induce a revolution in Iran, as it is not feasible to topple the Iranian regime by external force. Any occupying force would find it extremely hard to bring order to the chaos that it would unleash.

Simultaneously, depending on the developments in Iraq and Iran, it seems that the maps of Syria, Jordan and Iraq are going back to the draftsman's table for major redoing. Iran may present the answers to many questions during the coming weeks and months. If a US-induced shakeup succeeds in changing the regime in Iran - or changes the mind of the present regime - things would become very different for Azerbeijan and the rest of Central Asia. Energy pipelines would suddenly start sprouting in the region, all heading to the Persian Gulf via Iran. This is the most logical and economic route and needs hardly any extra infrastructure development.

If Iran suddenly falls into American camp, things would become difficult for Azerbeijan and Georgia because Russia would be extremely reluctant to let any energy resources bypass its own territory. Russia holds many cards: It can stir up enough trouble in south Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Ajaria to make it virtually impossible to complete the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project (BTC) slated to come into operation in 2005 and promising US $4 billion annually to Azerbeijan alone. All the western oil majors have a stake in this project. Russia can stop the supply of gas and electricity to Georgia, bringing down its whole economy. Russia can encourage Armenia to attack in Nagorno-Karabakh, sending another wave of refugees to Azerbeijan, thus causing anarchy and unrest and destabilizing the country. 800,000 refugees who fled the bloodshed in Nagorno-Karabakh in the early 1990s already burden Azerbeijan.

Russia, with its unmatched navy in the Caspian, can block any move to strengthen Azerbeijan's puny naval presence there. Signs are already visible that Russia is thinking about this option. On land, Russia has the support of many CIS countries that are equally wary of American designs in the region. A collective security force for the CIS is the vehicle that Russia is going to use to counter any expansions by 'foreign powers'. This was announced at a recent meeting of CIS security officials.

Igor Ivanov, Russia's Foreign Minister, has stated in no uncertain terms that American interference was detected behind 'spontaneous' demonstrations that led to the downfall of Shevardnadze. America has blamed Russia for creating trouble in Georgia and has issued a thinly veiled warning that Russia must remove its army bases from Georgia. Whatever happens in Georgia in the forthcoming elections, it is evident that a pro-American government will come into power, leaving much room for Russia to destabilize the country by supporting breakaway regions.

Both sides may make lofty claims for their intervention in Georgia but the core of the matter is that BTC will break the Russian monopoly on the energy routes and let western companies make profits on the transportation and sale of hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian and the Caucasus. Russia will do its best to stop the pipeline.

While all this would be happening, Iran would not be sitting quietly. There is no telling what might happen with the internal tussle between hardliners and moderates in Iran and between pro-American and anti-American elements in this country. The outcome is unpredictable at this stage.

With the fall of Saddam, Iraq has seen more foreign elements bent on combating American troops. Newsweek reported in its issue of 15th December, that Osama Bin Laden has reportedly shifted his focus to Iraq. This is still an X factor in the equation; we cannot say with any certainty as to what would be the overall impact of Al-Qaeda moves to fight a direct battle with American troops in Iraq.

Whatever happens elsewhere, the pressure would increase on Turkmenistan because of its vast natural resources and its strategic location that is ideally suited to keep an eye on the entire region. At some stage American interests and European interests in the region will diverge and act separately. This is likely to happen due to the American inclination towards unilateralism.

The real legacy of Saddam and Aliyev is that they have, unwittingly, created a New Great Game. We are living in an era where subtlety is not a virtue and the only game in town is the zero sum game. Winner takes all; loser goes to his tomb. Sheer power is apparently the only instrument left at the disposal of the statesman. We are returning to where we started. Nations and states are pursuing their own perceived interests with undiluted force of muscle, writing their own rules as they plow along. The ghosts of one living and one dead man will start haunting the region in January 2004. As Will and Ariel Durant foretold in 'The Lessons of History', we are witnessing "the barbarism welling up from within to bring the civilization to a close."

Note: A very perceptive and illuminating analysis of prospects in a region where such insight is a rare commodity, though it is not clear which civilization is to be brought to a close. Azerbeijan, trapped between Russia and Iran is in a particularly difficult position despite its US connection. The Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, with its mainly Armenian population, is a serious additional weakness as is the fact that the Nahichevan province is separated from the rest of Azerbeijan by Armenian territory. Ilham Aliyev would to well explore in Washington the possibilities of obtaining US support for an exchange of population and territory with Armenia that would give both countries better borders and a more homogenous population.
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