The electoral process in Afghanistan has surprised many observers. Afghans have demonstrated unambiguously that they are ready to build a new Afghanistan. The elections have clearly shown that, despite claims of the international news media, the Taleban has no popular base in the country. It was also clear that international forces, if only they are willing to make good on their commitments, are quite capable of countering the warlords, who, though thought to be all-powerful actors in Afghan politics, proved to be rather timid after all.

The recently elected President and his new cabinet will face so many problems and challenges that they will have no rest for the next five years. Rebuilding, corruption, the warlords, development, social issues, parliamentary elections and rebuilding national unity are just the most urgent of dozens of similar problems. One problem that attracts western attention more than all others is the drug issue. Studies by international organizations show that drug production has not decreased in Afghanistan, despite last year's widely publicized spectacles of the destruction of mature plants. Afghan authorities continue to threaten farmers that they will destroy their poppy fields again, but this threat is unlikely to be more effective than those of the past.

The Afghan economy is basically anachronistic. While the country has been hard hit by drought for several consecutive years and 25 years of war have damaged the agricultural infrastructure, the economy of Afghanistan is still based on agriculture. This despite the fact that nearly three Afghans out of four are under 40 years old and are likely to be more educated than their elders and trained in skills better suited to a non-agricultural economy.

UN experts and Afghan politicians have proposed the development of alternative crops in the country in order to diminish the attractiveness of opium prices. This is certainly one side of the manifold problem of poppy production. It is true that the same piece of land would yield three to four times more revenue to the Afghan farmer who cultivates poppies than to the one who produces wheat. But the farmer is at the lowest end of the opium production process, receiving merely $300 for one kilogram of raw opium, which will bring in many times that amount in the heroin trade in European suburbs. Dealers on all levels make much more money. So dealing with the problem through the angle of farmers' income is merely the tip of an iceberg.

Would helping farmers to grow fruit instead of opium help to reduce drug production? This is far from sure. On the one hand, drug dealers can easily increase their purchasing price and the cycle would start all over again. On the other hand, who can guarantee a farmer that he will not be forced to cultivate the evil crop illegally? Is it possible to ignore how drug lords treat farmers in Latin America?

In Afghanistan, warlords are not a by-product of opium. It is the other way around. Warlords do not earn huge amounts of money because farmers grow poppies; however, farmers grow poppies to provide the warlords with the product they need to finance their fiefdoms. The global opium supply does not seem to have significantly increased since Afghanistan became the number one producer. In the past, poppy fields were located elsewhere, primarily in Southeast Asia. Political instability and the absence of a strong state in Afghanistan simply led this country to become the best harbor for illegal activities, both drug trafficking and terrorism.

To deal seriously with the drug issue in Afghanistan, one must have a broad picture of the Afghan economy. As long as the anachronism of the economical system is not dealt with, this system will produce unwanted results. Destroying opium fields will certainly not cut drug production. This brutal method will merely reinforce the grip of the warlords on the poor farmers. Giving cash to people who renounce drug cultivation is guaranteed to encourage more and more people to cultivate opium. Alternative agriculture is likely to be challenged by criminal dealers. Therefore, eliminating poppy fields by smashing the crop or by chemical pollution, as intended by the US authorities, will not weaken the warlords. However, weakening the warlords can help to diminish poppy production. Eliminate the warlords and the farmer no longer has the incentive to grow poppies.

Note: It is true that eliminating the warlords is likely to reduce poppy production, providing the central Government does not take over their role and methods. However, it is much more difficult to eliminate the warlords than to spray poppy fields with chemicals. Political stability and less governmental corruption are the keys to solving the problem. But political stability will be very difficult to achieve before Karzai and his government control armed forces strong enough to defeat the warlords and enforce order in all parts of the country. And this may well not happen at all.